9.2  |  23 May 2003 to June 2004

favoured a general election (rather than the planned caucus approach) to select

the transitional National Assembly.

• The destabilising effect of Muqtada al-Sadr, who was considered “unlikely to

accept a transition process that does not facilitate a prominent role for himself

and for the Shia. The Assessments Staff assessed that al-Sadr’s militia – the

“Mahdi Army” – was poorly trained and organised, and the reported numbers

(between 6,000 and 8,000) “may well be exaggerated”.

• Continued Sunni disaffection, though the arrest of Saddam Hussein – while

likely to have a demoralising effect on some former regime elements – was

considered likely to encourage more of the Sunni to feel that they could

participate in the transition process without fear that the Saddam regime

would return.

622.  On Iran, Mr Dowse’s note reported:

“Iran wishes to promote Islam within Iraq, but no longer expects to see a mirror

image of its own government in place. A successful Islamic democracy on its border

is likely to fuel discontent among its own population and this will probably be a

cause for concern in Tehran. It will, however, continue its support to SCIRI with the

aim of securing Shia pre-eminence in the future political hierarchy. Passive support

for groups such as Ansar al-Islam is also likely to continue as long as the Coalition

remains in Iraq, but [we] stand by our judgement … that while Iran may seek to gain

influence … it is unlikely that they would participate directly in anti-Coalition activity.”

623.  On 17 December, the JIC assessed security in Iraq.353 It recorded that:

“After a difficult November the number of attacks against Coalition Forces has

fallen … Most attacks continue to take place in Baghdad and in the Sunni Arab

areas to the north and west.

“The UK area of responsibility is calmer.”

624.  The JIC judged that most attacks against the Coalition continued to be carried out

by Former Regime Elements.

625.  The capture of Saddam Hussein, in the JIC’s opinion:

“… removes a figurehead, and will at least damage the morale of his supporters

and offer encouragement to those many Iraqis who feared he could return. Coalition

policies will need to take advantage of this opportunity.”

626.  The JIC also judged that:

“Although we continue to see reports of alleged AQ personnel operating in Iraq and

support networks elsewhere, we have no evidence linking AQ to specific attacks.”

353  JIC Assessment, 17 December 2003, ‘Iraq Security’; JIC Assessment, 7 January 2004, ‘Iraq Security’.

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