The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
through
Turkey. He estimated that the requirement for Reservists was
“unlikely to be
much above
3,000, compared to the 7-8,000 we originally
expected”.
196.
Mr Hoon wrote
that the proposed role for the UK was “essentially as described
in
my Office’s
letter of 8 January”:
•
“During
initial US ground operations the ATG … would “conduct the Umm
Qasr/
al-Faw
operation as already planned.”
•
“Approximately
ten days later HQ 1 [(UK)] Armoured Division with 16 Air
Assault
Brigade
would relieve US forces in an area south of Basra and the
Euphrates,
including
the Rumaylah oilfields, enabling the US to press on
further north.”
•
“Whilst US
forces conduct decisive ground operations to isolate
Baghdad,
HQ 1 [(UK)]
Armoured Division with 7 Armoured Brigade could protect the
right
flank of
the US 1st Marine Expeditionary Force as it advances north. This
would
include
securing Basra International Airport and isolating (but not
entering)
Basra
itself.”
197.
Mr Hoon added
that the US was looking at possible additional tasks, but the
UK
would take
a cautious approach: “We do not intend that our force should bite
off more
than it can
chew, given its reliance on US logistic support.”
198.
Mr Hoon stated
that, as he and Mr Blair had discussed, a number of issues
still
needed
“finally to be resolved” before the UK could “conclude that the
overall US plan
represent[ed]
a winning concept”. Those included the “legal basis for any
operation”
and the
“credibility of plans for the aftermath”. The US was addressing the
“strategic
importance
of fixing Iraqi forces” in the North.
199.
The concept
for the campaign was “radically different from that employed in
the
1990-1991
Gulf Conflict”. It depended on “the achievement of overwhelming
effect”
to attack
the cohesion of the Iraqi regime and deterring opposition rather
than the
“application
of overwhelming force”. Much depended on achieving “shock and awe”
at
the outset
through the “application of largely US air power to targets
throughout Iraq”.
200.
Mr Hoon stated
that the plan would need further development to address
a
number of
“specific challenges (oilfields, displaced persons, handling Iran
etc.), but
no
insurmountable problems have been identified”. The threat from
conventional
Iraqi
forces was assessed as “limited, in part because of the expected
effects of US
air power”.
201.
The timescales
for possible action would mean that some risk would have to
be
taken on
the fitting of Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) equipment, but
that risk
was
“considered acceptable”.
414