12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
•
“As quickly
as possible, contribute to a safe and secure environment
within
which
humanitarian aid agencies are able to operate.”
•
“If
directed, be prepared to contribute to the reform of Iraq’s
security forces.”
94.
A later
Directive, issued on 30 July, included a “key”
priority:
“To support
the Coalition wider SSR effort where this can be done within
the
appropriate
UK scale of effort.”71
95.
This Directive
included a further task:
“Maintain
public order and safety using, where possible, local law
enforcement
organisations
supervised by military and civil police in order to achieve Iraqi
support
for
stability operations.”
96.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Mr Stephen Pattison, Head of UND
until June 2003,
described
UND’s involvement in police matters as “essentially
operational”.72
Since
1997 UND
had managed a Whitehall system to identify, train and deploy
civilian police
overseas.
Mr Pattison said:
“Obtaining
sufficient UK police officers to take part in international
policing was
always a
struggle. We needed to get the co‑operation of Chief Police
Officers. And
we needed
to find ways of attracting volunteers … We cast the net as wide as
we
could,
including canvassing recently retired officers.
“In most
cases the overseas requirement was for armed police, which rules
out
most UK
officers. So we focused on getting UK officers into niche roles
where their
expertise
would add to the international police force’s skills, rather than
into front line
executive
policing.
“… And
deploying UK police was not straightforward: all UK overseas police
officers
are
volunteers, ACPO [Association of Chief Police Officers] and the
Home Office
would only
agree to deployment when certain conditions were met (security,
in
mission
support structure) and the funding had to be
identified.”
97.
Mr Pattison
told the Inquiry that UND had not been tasked to undertake
any
preparatory
work, but had identified a potential problem and acted to address
it.73
He said
that there was no‑one in Whitehall pulling together knowledge of
policing to
design the
kind of police operation needed in Iraq.
In his
recollection, “awareness of our
responsibilities
under the Geneva Convention and Hague regulations did not inform
our
thinking
about policing in the run‑up to the war.”
71
Minute CDS
to CJO, 30 July 2003, ‘Chief of the Defence Staff Executive
Directive to the Joint
Commander
Operation TELIC Edition 3’.
72
Statement,
6 January 2011, pages 12‑13.
73
Public
hearing, 31 January 2011, pages 5 and 9.
85