Introduction

• extracts from, or summaries of, exchanges between former Prime Ministers and

the former US President; and

• material drawn from or otherwise relating to very sensitive security and

intelligence sources, including a large number of Assessments by the Joint

Intelligence Committee (JIC).

59. This information is central to understanding the UK Government’s strategic

decision-making in Iraq, and is therefore essential to the Inquiry’s work. Disclosure

of such information is undertaken under the terms of the Protocol agreed between the

Government and the Inquiry at the outset of the Inquiry. In agreeing to the inclusion

of this material, the Government has had regard to:

• the exceptional nature of the Inquiry (a once in a generation Public Inquiry that is

entirely independent of government);

• the exceptional public interest in the matters which the Inquiry was established

to examine;

• the importance of the Inquiry being able to consider these matters in the round

and to give a proper and sufficient account of them in its Report; and

• the consequent justification of the inclusion of such material in the Report to the

extent strictly necessary to enable the Inquiry to fulfil its task.

60. In reaching agreement to the publication of material necessary for the purposes of

the Inquiry, the Government has made clear that the publication of this material in these

exceptional circumstances does not involve the setting of any precedent, that any future

decisions about the disclosure of comparable material (including under the Freedom of

Information Act 2000) must be taken on their merits, and that the concept of precedent

has no place in relation to disclosure decisions.

61. Sir Jeremy Heywood’s letters of 21 January 2014 and 22 May 2014, which record

his agreement to the publication of material from Cabinet minutes and communications

between Mr Blair and President Bush, can be read in full on the Inquiry’s website.14

62. The Inquiry recognises the importance of the principle of protecting the

confidentiality of Cabinet discussions in order to support collective Cabinet responsibility

and effective government. But, for the reasons set out above, it also considered that it

would not be possible to complete its task effectively without the ability to refer to the

records of Cabinet meetings (entitled Cabinet Conclusions) or the records of relevant

Sub-Committees of Cabinet.

14 Letter Heywood to Aldred, 21 January 2014, ‘Chilcot Inquiry – Cabinet Papers’; Letter Heywood to

Aldred, 22 May 2014, ‘UK/US Records – Declassification Request’.

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