10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
electricity
for between seven and 12 hours a day. Mains water was not suitable
for
drinking;
families that could afford it bought bottled water. Hospitals were
dirty and poorly
staffed and
equipped. Experienced doctors had left the country or been killed.
Medicine
was
expensive and in short supply. School standards were
low.
724.
More
positively, Dr Marsden reported that people still rejoiced in their
greater
political
freedom. Civil society was growing. The better off could enjoy new
consumer
goods and
the freedom to travel outside Iraq. There were signs of growth in
the local
economy and
public sector salaries had steadily increased.
725.
Dr Marsden
sent Ms Aldred the third iteration of the Better Basra Action
Plan
(BBP3) on 2
March.413
In her
covering letter, Dr Marsden advised that:
“For the
first time we have got a fully integrated plan that has been
drafted jointly
by the
Consulate [British Embassy Office Basra], the PRT and
MND(SE).”
726.
Dr Marsden
also advised that BBP3 had also been discussed in detail with
the
Head of the
US Embassy Regional Office in Basra, who was content with it
(though he
did not
intend to clear it formally with Washington).
727.
BBP3 stated
that it was “a comprehensive strategy for bringing Basra to the
point
where it
can transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)”. It sought to
ensure that all nine
“lines of
operation” (political, security, rule of law, the judiciary,
prisons, governance,
infrastructure,
economic development and strategic communications) were
integrated
under a
single, overarching political strategy. BBP3 set out for each line
of operation, key
benchmarks
for March and June 2007, a detailed work plan, and an estimate of
the cost
of
implementing proposed new projects (which totalled some £21m in
2007/08). Delivery
of BBP3
would be “driven by” the southern Iraq Steering Group
(SISG).
728.
The political
and security lines of operation are described in Section 9.5 and
the
rule of
law, judiciary and prisons lines of operation in Section
12.1.
729.
On governance,
BBP3 stated that the UK’s focus would continue to be to help
the
Provincial
Council to plan for, access and spend resources in a prioritised,
transparent
and
accountable way, and to develop an effective working relationship
with Baghdad to
ensure that
Basra got its share of the national budget.
730.
On
infrastructure, the UK’s objective was to support the Provincial
Council to
deliver
better services using Iraqi resources, while continuing to use
CERPs funding,
where
appropriate, for “last mile service provision”.
731.
On economic
development, the UK’s priorities were to boost job creation,
lay
the
foundations for more entrepreneurial activity and cross-border
trade, support the
agricultural
sector, and build the Provincial Government’s capacity to support
economic
413
Letter
Marsden to Aldred, 2 March 2007, ‘Better Basra’ attaching Paper
Basra Consulate/PRT/
MND(SE), 1
March 2007, ‘Better Basra Mark 3: The 2007 plan’.
313