6.4 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003

• truth and reconciliation commissions for lower-level accused or where there was

insufficient evidence for prosecution; and

• use of the existing criminal justice system in Iraq.

687. Mr Rycroft explained to Mr Blair that he expected Lord Goldsmith to reject the

arguments put forward on behalf of INDICT relating to the 1990 hostage-taking cases

on the grounds that there was almost no prospect of a successful prosecution. He

also commented that the FCO advice on a tribunal “will … not enhance your view of

government lawyers”.339

688. Mr Rycroft advised Mr Blair that No.10 officials were “pushing back” on both

issues. Mr Blair should tell Ms Clwyd he was interested in both proposals and that he

had asked for “proper legal advice”. On the tribunal, Mr Blair’s line should be:

“… it is essential that we take a strong line on human rights in Iraq (as we did in the

dossier). We are considering whether we should propose the establishment of an

International Criminal Tribunal for Iraq, or some other mechanism, to ensure that

Saddam and others guilty of the most horrendous crimes can be brought to justice.”

689. Mr Rycroft instructed the FCO, the Attorney General’s Office and the Cabinet

Office to take account of the potential need to bring Saddam Hussein and his inner circle

to justice as part of Whitehall work on the future of Iraq.340 He asked the FCO to do more

work on options, including how best to let Saddam Hussein’s inner circle know that their

interests would be best served by breaking with him, and the Attorney General’s Office

to look again at the prosecution of the 1990 crimes: “On the face of it, there is much

advantage in letting it be known that we are starting investigations against Saddam for

these crimes.”

690. The Attorney General’s Office sent a holding reply on 17 October, explaining that

Lord Goldsmith was still considering the material submitted on behalf of INDICT and had

not yet responded to Ms Clwyd or INDICT.341

691. Lord Goldsmith sent a substantive reply to Ms Clwyd on 24 January 2003, which is

addressed in the Box on INDICT in Section 3.6.342

692. Prosecution for war crimes was discussed at the first round of US/UK inter-agency

talks on post-conflict Iraq in Washington on 6 November.

693. Updated FCO advice to No.10 followed in early December.

694. Both are addressed later in this Section.

339 Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 16 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Indicting Saddam’.

340 Letter Rycroft to Sedwill, 23 October 2002, ‘ICTY-type tribunal for Iraq’.

341 Letter Adams to Rycroft, 17 October 2002, ‘INDICT – Correspondence with Ann Clwyd MP’.

342 Letter Goldsmith to Clwyd, 24 January 2003, ‘Saddam Hussein, Tariq Aziz, Ali Hassan Al-Majid and

Taha Ramadan’.

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