The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
But it drew
the UK and the US “inexorably into questions of cover in
international
law for any
such military action”. Lord Goldsmith had expressed “serious
doubt”
that any
existing resolution would provide “sufficient cover”.
•
Mr Straw’s
“strong advice” was “not to get pinned down on the question …
of
whether a
new UNSC mandate would be needed for military action”. Mr
Blair
should
“readily acknowledge” that the UK had “always operated within
the
framework
of international law”.
•
Mr Straw
had asked for work on whether it would be possible to strengthen
the
forthcoming
resolution bringing the Goods Review List into operation “in
respect
of weapons
inspectors”.
•
Mr Blair could
say that the document [for publication] on Iraq would be
produced
“shortly”.
In Mr Straw’s view the UK could “certainly get something out
pretty
quickly”.
•
The Early
Day Motion signed by more than 150 members of the PLP had
gained
support
because “it spoke of no military action ‘at this time’; and called
for
weapons
inspectors to go back”.239
628.
During PMQs
on 10 April, Mr Blair emphasised the threat Iraq posed
to
the world,
and the need for Saddam Hussein to comply with the UN
resolutions
and allow
weapons inspectors back into Iraq. The region would be a
better
place
without Saddam Hussein, but the method of achieving that was
“open
to consultation
and deliberation”.
629.
During PMQs on
10 April, Mr Iain Duncan Smith, leader of the Opposition,
and
other MPs
asked a number of questions on Iraq.240
630.
Stating that
Iraq would “if left unchecked … be able to deploy its weapons
of
mass
destruction against targets in western Europe, including the United
Kingdom”,
Mr Duncan
Smith asked Mr Blair:
•
“… to
confirm reports that he told President Bush … that if military
action is
needed
against Saddam Hussein, the British Government will support
and,
if necessary
contribute to it?”;
•
“… to
confirm that getting rid of Saddam Hussein may now be an objective
of
the
Government”;
•
whether he
believed that “countering the growing threat from Saddam
Hussein”
was “about
protecting lives in Britain and the lives of British forces abroad,
and
not just
about supporting our allies”; and
•
in a
reference to his speech at College Station, whether Mr Blair
believed that
those who
refused to accept the need to act “misunderstand the nature of
the
threat, or
that they will simply refuse to accept any evidence they are
given”.
239
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 9 April 2002, ‘Your Commons’
Statement’.
240
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 10 April
2002, columns 11-18.
502