The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
438.
The points
made by Mr Aldouri, who spoke at the beginning and end of
the
debate, included:
•
The US and
the UK had propagated “falsehoods and untrue
allegations”
about
“Iraq’s compliance and implementation of the relevant
Security
Council resolutions”.
•
Ninety-five
percent of the disarmament tasks had been completed between
1991
and
1994.
•
Iraq had
recently unilaterally declared its missile programme and was
destroying
the Al
Samoud 2 missiles which UNMOVIC had deemed to be
proscribed.
•
None of the
“allegations” presented to the Council by Secretary Powell
on
5 February
had “proved to be true”.
•
The most
recent “intelligence report produced by the UK [the No.10
dossier]”,
contained
previously published information.
•
Recent
allegations about RPVs were unfounded. They were small
experimental
aircraft
which had been examined by the inspectors.
439.
In both his
opening and closing statements, Mr Aldouri repeated that Iraq
had
“taken the
strategic decision” to rid itself of weapons of mass
destruction.
440.
In response
to his requests, Mr Blair was given several notes on 15
and
16 March
about Iraq’s WMD and the activities of the inspectors since
1991.
441.
They
comprised a series of statements setting out past problems
without
any caveats
about how they should be interpreted in relation to Iraq’s
current
capabilities
and intent.
442.
A note on the
subjects covered by UNMOVIC’s “clusters” report listed
the
unresolved
issues, commenting: “There are
therefore questions to which UNMOVIC
has been
unable to obtain answers in every one of the following 29
areas.”162
443.
A note on the
types of CBW produced by Iraq, drawing on open sources
whose
accuracy
had been endorsed by Porton Down,163
graphically
described the toxicity and
effects of
various agents, together with a comment on Iraq’s capability taken
from the
UNMOVIC
“clusters” report.164
444.
A note on
UNMOVIC activities between 1998 and 2002 advised Mr Blair that
Iraq
maintained
that “no proscribed activities took place in that period” and had
made no
162
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 15 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Blix “Clusters”
Report’.
163
The
headquarters for the Defence Science and Technology
Laboratory.
164
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 15 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Chemical and
Biological Weapons’.
370