Executive
Summary
for the
administration and reconstruction of post‑conflict Iraq, the
reluctance
of potential
international partners to contribute to the post‑conflict
effort.
•
The
Government, which lacked both clear Ministerial oversight of
post‑conflict
strategy,
planning and preparation, and effective co‑ordination
between
government
departments, failed to analyse or manage those risks
adequately.
•
Mr Blair,
who recognised the significance of the post‑conflict phase,
did
not press
President Bush for definite assurances about US plans, did
not
consider or
seek advice on whether the absence of a satisfactory plan
called
for
reassessment of the terms of the UK’s engagement and did not
make
agreement
on such a plan a condition of UK participation in military
action.
815.
The following
key findings are from Section 8:
•
It took
less than a month to achieve the departure of Saddam
Hussein
and the fall
of Baghdad.
•
The
decision to advance into Basra was made by military
commanders
on the ground.
•
The UK was
unprepared for the media response to the initial difficulties. It
had
also
underestimated the need for sustained communication of key
strategic
messages to
inform public opinion about the objectives and progress of
the
military
campaign, including in Iraq.
•
For any
future military operations, arrangements to agree and disseminate
key
strategic
messages need to be put in place, in both London and on the
ground,
before
operations begin.
•
The UK
acceded to the post‑invasion US request that it assume leadership
of a
military
Area of Responsibility (AOR) encompassing four provinces in
southern
Iraq, a
position it then held for six years, without a formal Ministerial
decision and
without
carrying out a robust analysis of the strategic implications for
the UK or
the
military’s capacity to support the UK’s potential obligations in
the region.
816.
The following
key findings are from Section 9.8, and relate to evidence
in
Sections 9.1
to 9.7:
•
Between
2003 and 2009, the UK’s most consistent strategic objective in
relation
to Iraq was
to reduce the level of its deployed forces.
•
The UK
struggled from the start to have a decisive effect on the
Coalition
Provisional
Authority’s (CPA’s) policies, even though it was fully
implicated
in its decisions
as joint Occupying Power.
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