The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1016.
Mr Tony
Brenton, Chargé d’Affaires at the British Embassy Washington,
reported
overnight
on 5/6 March that “barring a highly improbable volte face by
Saddam”, the US
was “now
firmly on track for military action – with or without a second …
resolution”; and
that the
“only event which might significantly affect their timetable would
be problems
for the
UK”.319
That had
been described as “huge – like trying to play football without
the
quarterback”.
The US was “therefore pulling out all the stops at the
UN”.
1017.
Mr Brenton
reported that the US fully understood the importance of the
second
resolution
for the UK and he had explained the Parliamentary arithmetic. He
also
reported
that the US had “gained the impression that we need the resolution
for legal
reasons”
and that he had “explained the real situation”.
1018.
Mr Brenton
advised that the US was “reasonably hopeful of getting the
nine
votes
(although a little disturbed that the Mexicans have not yet come
back to them
on our
suggested amendment)”. The US was “sanguine” about Russia, and
thought
China would
not veto “unless, at least, the French and Russians do”. The US
could
not “call” France.
1019.
The US would
discuss tactics with Mr Straw in New York. The US
intention
remained
“to go for a vote next week, perhaps with … a very short ultimatum
tagged
on”. He had
told one of his contacts that “it was not helpful for the US to
refer to the
possibility
of not going for a vote”.
1020.
Mr Brenton
concluded:
“… the
military clock is now audibly ticking and only a major shock to our
(ie UK)
plans is
likely to jolt it substantially. The US can be expected to deal
quite firmly with
any efforts
in the UN to slow things down.”
1021.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock advised that the US would not countenance the
use
of
benchmarks. That would delay the military timetable.
1022.
Reporting
discussions in New York on 5 March, Sir Jeremy Greenstock
wrote
that the US
would not countenance benchmarks; that “simply risked delaying
the
1023.
Sir Jeremy and
Ambassador Negroponte had agreed on the need to avoid
the
risk that
Dr Blix would say that Iraq was demonstrating “unconditional,
active and full
co-operation”.
Sir Jeremy had agreed with Ambassador Negroponte and Mr Arias
that
wording was
needed “on Iraq demonstrating a genuine change of heart”: “But this
had
to be
something that could not be played back at us, e.g. in a statement
by Saddam
saying he
had taken an ‘unconditional and irreversible decision’.” One key
test was Iraq
yielding
its WMD.
319
Telegram
294 Washington to FCO London, 6 March 2003, ‘Personal Iraq: UN
Endgame’.
320
Telegram
353 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq: 5
March’.
362