9.8 |
Conclusions: The post-conflict period
52.
UK involvement
in CPA decisions about the scope and implementation of
de‑Ba’athification
policy is considered in Section 11.2.
53.
In some areas,
the UK was able to affect CPA policy through the influence
that
Mr Sawers
or his successor Sir Jeremy Greenstock exerted on senior US
officials. Both
used their
diplomatic experience to build connections with Iraqi politicians
and contribute
to the
political development of Iraq. Instances of UK influence
included:
•
Mr Sawers’
involvement in the plans for an Interim Iraqi Administration,
in
respect of
which he considered that “much of the thinking is
ours”.11
•
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock’s “two chickens, two eggs” plan, which overcame
political
stalemate
between the CPA and Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani on how the new
Iraqi
Constitution
should be created. The plan led to the 15 November
Agreement
which set
the timetable for transfer of sovereignty to a transitional
administration
by 30 June
2004.
•
Ensuring
that negotiations on the content of the Transitional Administrative
Law
reached a
successful conclusion. Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the Inquiry
that
he had
prevented the Kurdish delegation from leaving, “which Bremer
wasn’t
•
The level
of female representation in Iraq’s new political structures,
including the
25 percent
“goal” for members of the National Assembly set by the
Transitional
Administrative
Law, which the UK pursued with some success.
54.
In the absence
of decision-making arrangements in which the UK had a
formal
role, too
much reliance was placed on communication between Mr Blair and
President
Bush, one
of the very small number of ways of influencing US policy. Some
issues were
addressed
by this route: for instance, using his regular conversations with
President
Bush,
Mr Blair was able, with some success, to urge caution in
relation to the US
operation
in Fallujah in April 2004.
55.
But the
channel of communication between Prime Minister and President
should be
reserved
for the most strategic and most intractable issues. It is not the
right mechanism
for
day-to-day policy-making or an effective way of making tactical
decisions.
56.
It is
impossible to say whether a greater and more formal UK input to CPA
decisions
would have
led to better outcomes. But it is clear that the UK’s ability to
influence
decisions
made by the CPA was not commensurate with its responsibilities as
joint
Occupying
Power.
57.
From early
June 2003, and throughout the summer, there were signs that
security
in both
Baghdad and the South was deteriorating. The MOD’s Strategic
Planning
11 Telegram
028 IraqRep to FCO London, 1 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Political
Process’.
12
Private
hearing, 26 May 2010, page 64.
479