The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Decisions
on how to spend the Development Fund for Iraq, which
resolution
1483 gave
the CPA the power to make. CPA Regulation No.2
subsequently
vested
Ambassador Bremer with control of the Fund, effectively placing
it
under US
control. This exacerbated concerns about the
under‑resourcing
of CPA(South)
as expressed in Mr Straw’s letter to Mr Blair of 5 June
2003
(see Section
10.1).
•
The
creation of the Iraqi Central Bank as an independent body in July
2003
(see
Sections 9.2 and 10.1). This came as a surprise to the UK despite
the
close
involvement of officials from the Treasury in arrangements for
Iraq’s
new currency
and budget.
•
The
creation of a new Iraqi Central Criminal Court (see Section 9.2),
the
announcement
of which UK officials could not delay for long enough
to
enable the
Attorney General to give his view on its legality under the
terms
of resolution 1483.
•
Production
of the CPA’s ‘Vision for Iraq’ and ‘Achieving the Vision’
(see
Sections 9.2
and 10.1).
Mr Sawers
alerted the FCO to the first document on
6 July when
it was already at an advanced stage of drafting, and by 18 July
it
had been
signed off by the Pentagon. No formal UK approval was sought
for
a document
which was intended to provide strategic direction to the
Coalition’s
non‑military
effort in Iraq.
676.
UK involvement
in CPA decisions about the scope and implementation of
de‑Ba’athification
policy is considered in Section 11.2.
677.
In some areas,
the UK was able to affect CPA policy through the influence
that
Mr Sawers
or his successor Sir Jeremy Greenstock exerted on senior US
officials. Both
used their
diplomatic experience to build connections with Iraqi politicians
and contribute
to the
political development of Iraq. Instances of UK influence
included:
•
Mr Sawers’
involvement in the plans for an Interim Iraqi
Administration,
in respect
of which he considered that “much of the thinking is
ours”.236
•
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock’s “two chickens, two eggs” plan, which overcame
political
stalemate
between the CPA and Grand Ayatollah al‑Sistani on how the new
Iraqi
Constitution
should be created. The plan led to the 15 November
Agreement
which set
the timetable for transfer of sovereignty to a transitional
administration
by 30 June
2004.
•
Ensuring
that negotiations on the content of the Transitional Administrative
Law
reached a
successful conclusion. Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the Inquiry
that
he had
prevented the Kurdish delegation from leaving, “which Bremer
wasn’t
236
Telegram
028 IraqRep to FCO London, 1 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Political
Process’.
237
Private
hearing, 26 May 2010, page 64.
92