4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
meetings about it, it led him
to the conclusion, as he set out in the Foreword,
that he
did believe it was established beyond doubt that Saddam
had continued
to produce chemical
and biological weapons, that he continued to put his
efforts to
develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend
the
range
of his ballistic missile programme, and he sees WMD as
essential to his
545.
Sir Richard
Dearlove told the Inquiry that he did not recall seeing the
Foreword.282
546.
Mr Scarlett
sent a “final draft version of the dossier” to Mr Campbell
on
20 September.283
He wrote
that he had taken account of additional comments
received
over the
last 24 hours, and that he was:
“… content
that the text now reflects as fully and accurately as possible
the
intelligence
picture on Saddam’s mass destruction weapons.”
547.
Copies of the
minute and draft dossier were sent to Mr Powell, Sir David
Manning,
Sir David
Omand and “JIC Members”.
548.
The draft
included Mr Blair’s Foreword. Other changes from the
previous
draft included:
•
the
omission of the Conclusions section;
•
amendment
of the text on nuclear timelines to clarify that “while
sanctions
remain
effective Iraq would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon. If
they
were
removed or prove ineffective, it would take Iraq at least five
years to
produce
sufficient fissile material for a weapon
indigenously”;
•
removal of
the reference to RDDs; and
•
omission of
the phrase “if he believes his regime is under threat”, in
relation
to the
statement that Saddam Hussein would be willing to use chemical
and
biological
weapons.
549.
The text in
the published version relating to machines which could be
used
in a gas centrifuge
process was not changed.
550.
In response to
questioning about his decision to omit the qualifying
phrase
in relation
to Saddam Hussein only using chemical and biological weapons if
his
regime was
under attack, and the impact of that omission on the perception of
the
threat,
Mr Scarlett told Lord Hutton that the change “was as a result
of the exercise
281
Public
hearing, 12 January 2010, page 90.
282
Private
hearing, 16 June 2010, page 57.
283
Minute
Scarlett to Campbell, 20 September 2002, ‘Iraqi WMD: Public
Presentation of Intelligence
Material’
attaching Paper, 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq’s Programme for Weapons
of Mass Destruction:
The Assessment
of the British Government’.
215