15.1 | Civilian
personnel
in such
circumstances”. Many local staff had been killed or injured, or had
left because
of security
concerns.
468.
On 20 October,
DOP(I) agreed that the FCO would lead urgent work on
the
security of
staff in Basra, identifying options, costs and risks for discussion
at the
469.
On 24 October,
Mr Casey sent Mrs Beckett a paper310
on the future
of the UK
civilian
presence at the Basra Palace site, which, he explained, reflected
“Ministers’ clear
wish to
take action immediately to draw down the number of civilian staff
working from
470.
In the paper,
the IPU stated:
“The threat
to our civilian staff operating from the Basra Palace Compound
(BPC)
has risen
steadily over the last year, progressively constraining our
operations …
We are now
at the point where, without effective military action to reduce
the
IDF threat,
our operations from BPC face an unacceptable level of
risk.
“We need to
respond. We have four broad options:
a) Continue
to run all our civilian operations from BPC …
b) Start a
phased reduction in staff at BPC now …
c) Withdraw
our entire civilian operation from BPC now, moving
only a very
small
number to BAS [Basra Air Station], and taking the bulk out of
theatre …
d) Withdraw
our civilian presence from Southern Iraq altogether.
“Until now
we have recommended that we maintain our civilian operations at
BPC,
despite the
deteriorating security situation. We have recently launched a
major,
integrated
military and civilian effort in Basra – Op SINBAD/Better Basra
[see
Section
10.2] – which is designed to produce sustainable change in the city
and to
achieve
transition to Iraqi‑led security responsibility. The civilian
component is critical
to the
success of this effort.
“But in the
last month the security threat has become so acute that,
unless
current
trends can be
reversed, in particular by direct action to reduce IDF,
the
risks
to our
civilian staff in BPC can no longer be justified. We could suffer a
catastrophic
incident,
as the US has, at any time. The US has just decided to scale back
their
BPC
operation to a minimum.
“We
therefore recommend Option (b). This will
further constrain our work, with
some
negative impact on SINBAD/Better Basra …
309
Minutes, 20
October 2006, DOP(I).
310
Dated 25
October, one day later than the covering minute.
311
Minute
Casey to Private Secretary [FCO], 24 October [2006], ‘DOP:
Political Strategy & Basra Palace
Site’.
327