4.4 | The
search for WMD
921.
Mr Blair
sought to redefine the public debate, shifting focus away from the
failure
to find WMD
and concerns about the reliability of intelligence towards efforts
to counter
global
proliferation and what he assessed to be the positive impact of
military action in
Iraq on
those efforts.
922.
On
5 October, in response to the failure to find “enough on WMD”
and the
deteriorating
security situation in Iraq, Mr Blair outlined to President
Bush a new strategy
“to get us
back on the high ground and get the public … to focus on the big
picture”.
He concluded:
“WMD/terror
remains the 21st century threat. Our global agenda is the only way
to a
better
future not just for us but for the world. We’re not going soft on
it. We’re going
to be
utterly determined on it, because it’s right.”
923.
In autumn
2003, the ISG faced increasing obstacles to its WMD
investigations,
caused
mostly by the deteriorating security situation,
including:
•
constraints
on ISG staff mobility;
•
a
reluctance among Iraqi experts to talk openly about Saddam
Hussein’s WMD
programmes;
and
•
growing
pressure from Washington to transfer resources from the search
for
WMD to
counter-insurgency.
924.
The diversion
of resources from WMD to counter-insurgency was reported to
have
contributed
to Dr Kay’s decision in December to resign as Head of the
ISG.
925.
On
11 January 2004, in an interview with Sir David Frost,
Mr Blair drew attention
to emerging
evidence from the ISG of “clandestine operations that should have
been
disclosed
to the United Nations”. Mr Blair still believed weapons would
be found, but
commented
that “we just have to wait and see”.
926.
Points made in
a Cabinet discussion on Iraq on 15 January included
the
observation
that public opinion continued to focus on the absence of WMD,
while
the broader
counter-proliferation story was inadequately covered.
927.
Pressure for
an independent inquiry in the UK continued to grow.
928.
Secretary
Powell’s comment on 24 January that it was an “open
question”
whether
Iraq held any stocks of WMD, widely reported in the UK media,
caused the
UK Government
considerable difficulty.
929.
The
Government’s response was to try to keep “in very close step” with
the US.
As late as
26 January, UK officials informed their US counterparts that
the Government
would
continue to argue that, after the ISC, FAC and Hutton, there was no
need for a
further
inquiry on intelligence.
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