The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
193.
Mr Straw
explained that:
“Our
lawyers are working urgently with the Americans to concert
positions on the
legal basis
for ORHA’s activity, making clear that this is essential to our
longer-term
commitment.”
194.
Mr Straw
reiterated Lord Goldsmith’s advice that the UK must be able to
veto
ORHA
activities, especially in areas controlled by UK forces. He also
stated that:
“We would
need to reconsider our involvement if the US tried to use it
[ORHA]
to impose
radical restructuring in the absence of UN
authorisation.”
195.
The UK’s need
for an MOU containing “clear ground rules” was reinforced
by
Mr Brenton
to Mr Bellinger in Washington.97
In response
to US concerns that an MOU
could be
misinterpreted as a “secret pact”, Mr Brenton advised that “there
was a real
political
need for the MOU in London”.
196.
Mr Bellinger
also observed that the US administration had not yet decided
between
the omnibus
and “smaller chunks” approaches to the new Security Council
resolution.
197.
On 15 April, a
DFID official visiting Iraq reported to Ms Short that ORHA
was
“failing;
and incapable of delivering to our timeframes”.98
198.
At the meeting
of the AHMGIR on 16 April, Ms Short reported that a recent
DFID
mission to
consider further support for ORHA had reported “serious
organisational
weaknesses”.99
She would
discuss it with the team on their return.
199.
At the same
meeting, Mr Hoon commissioned urgent advice on whether the
UK
should lead
one of ORHA’s regional offices.100
200.
Later that
day, the IPU produced a note on the issue. The note again described
the
UK’s legal
concerns, including that “we might be regarded as responsible for
Coalition
actions in
areas where there are no UK forces present”.
201.
The IPU’s
advice was to defer any commitment until the practical implications
had
been fully
understood.
202.
In his
statement to the Inquiry Maj Gen Cross wrote:
“… it had
become very clear to me that there were still serious concerns
relating
to
potential political and legality issues. The only clear
instructions I received
throughout
this period therefore was that I should not commit the UK to
financial
or any
other responsibilities which might tie us into any ORHA
plans.”101
97
Telegram
504 Washington to FCO London, 15 April 2003, ‘US/Iraq: Phase
IV’.
98
Minute PPS
to Secretary of State [DFID], 15 April 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary/Tim
Cross meeting’.
99
Minutes, 16
April 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
100
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Support for ORHA
Regional Office’ attaching
Note IPU,
16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA Regional Offices’.
101
Statement
Cross, 7 December 2009, page 18.
162