9.2  |  23 May 2003 to June 2004

Provisional Authority and the United Nations would work to reach agreement on a

transition mechanism that would have the broad-based support of the Iraqi people.”

771.  The same telegram recorded the UK report to the Security Council on progress in

the provision of basic services, economic and reconstruction issues as well as judicial

reform and human rights. Summarising other Security Council members’ reactions,

UKMIS New York said that:

“Council members generally support the Brahimi report. Many raise questions about

the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), the consultation with wider Iraqis and

the scope for UN involvement. Russia, Germany and France express openness to

consider a Council decision to support the UN’s future role in Iraq but do not press.

Russia again raises the possibility of an international conference.”

772.  Responding to points about the Security Agreement, Sir Emyr Jones Parry said

“for now resolution 1511 gave all the clarity we needed on security”.

773.  Sir Jeremy Greenstock called on Mr Blair on the same day as the US/UK briefing

to the Security Council.426 Sir Jeremy highlighted the tension between providing

continuity through the transition to Iraqi sovereignty and the need for a clear end to

Occupation. He felt that the US “realised that a new UNSCR would be needed” to deal

with post-transition structures.

774.  Mr Llewellyn wrote to the IPU on 25 February.427 In his letter he expressed

concern that the CPA was not consulting the UN Special Representative to the

Secretary-General on draft legislation covering economic reform and governance,

as was clearly required by resolution 1483.

775.  Consultation had taken place until the death of Mr Vieira de Mello on

19 August 2003. But when FCO Legal Advisers subsequently tried to establish with

the CPA what form of consultation was taking place, their response made clear that

consultation had probably ceased since the departure of the UN in the aftermath of the

August bombing.

776.  Contact between lawyers to point to the legal requirement and so encourage

consultation had got nowhere. In Mr Llewellyn’s view, the extensive body of CPA

legislation dealing with economic reform and governance matters since August 2003

was therefore of questionable lawfulness. The risk of claims against the UK could not

be ruled out.

777.  Mr Llewellyn therefore recommended that the matter should be taken up at a more

senior level, or that the UK should simply conduct the UN consultation itself by sending

drafts to the office of Mr Mountain in New York.

426  Letter Cannon to Owen, 24 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s call on the Prime Minister,

24 February’.

427  Minute Llewellyn to Crompton, 25 February 2004, ‘Iraq: CPA Legislation: Need for UN Coordination’.

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