The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
360.
On 12 May, Ms
Short resigned from the Government. In her letter of
resignation
to Mr Blair
she said that she thought the run-up to the conflict had been
mishandled,
but had
agreed to stay to support the reconstruction
effort.203
However:
“… the
assurances you gave me about the need for a UN mandate to establish
a
legitimate
Iraqi government have been breached. The Security Council
resolution
that you
and Jack [Straw] have so secretly negotiated contradicts the
assurances I
have given
in the House of Commons and elsewhere about the legal authority of
the
Occupying
Powers, and the need for a UN-led process to establish a legitimate
Iraqi
government.
This makes my position impossible.”
361.
Ms Short was
succeeded by Baroness Amos, who had previously been Minister
of
State for
International Development.
362.
Mr Hilary
Benn was appointed Minister of State.
363.
Ms Short’s
resignation and the Mr Blair’s response are addressed in more
detail
in Section
9.1.
364.
Baroness Amos
attended the 15 May meeting of the AHMGIR.204
365.
The Annotated
Agenda for the AHMGIR meeting stated that UK forces in
southern
Iraq
generally enjoyed the goodwill of the local population and emerging
political
leaders,
but that a continued permissive environment and, in the medium
term, the
withdrawal
of UK forces “depends in part on the local population receiving
real benefits
from
Coalition occupation”.205
The scale
of the reconstruction challenge was “enormous”.
Large
projects would fall to ORHA and subsequently the Iraqi authorities.
But there was
a case now
for “smaller refurbishment projects”. ORHA had plans for such
projects but
had been
slow to implement them. “In the meantime, given the relatively
benign security
situation,
UK forces have spare capacity to turn to reconstruction
efforts.”
366.
The Annotated
Agenda also stated that, of the £10m allocated to the UK
military
for quick
impact projects (QIPs), only £50,000 had been spent. Of the £30m
allocated
to the UK
military for humanitarian relief operations in the UK’s AO, only
£3m had been
committed
and £1m spent. The remainder could be used for other
purposes.
367.
In discussion,
Mr Boateng agreed that the MOD could spend the balance
of
the £10m
allocated for QIPs, but said that “other funds for reconstruction”
had been
allocated
to DFID.206
The MOD and
DFID needed to discuss the issue.
368.
Baroness Amos
said that ORHA needed some quick wins to establish its
reputation.
DFID would put ideas to Ministers the following week.
203
Short
C. An
Honourable Deception: New Labour, Iraq and the Misuse of
Power. The Free
Press, 2004.
204
Minutes, 15
May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
205
Annotated
Agenda, 15 May, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
206
Minutes, 15
May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
66