12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
946.
The Annotated
Agenda for the DOP(I) meeting on 12 October (circulated
on
11 October)
confirmed that a joint statement had been agreed.893
947.
The final
paper for Mr Blair was produced on 30 September by the FCO,
the MOD
and
DFID.894
It was sent
to No.10 by Mr Peter Hayes, Principal Private Secretary
to
Mr Straw.
It stated:
“The
security incident on 19 September … highlights what was previously
more
opaque,
that we face acute challenges in achieving our objectives in the
South‑East
region.
Stability in the South‑East is being threatened by intense rivalry
among
political
parties and their militias. Criminality, jockeying for patronage
and leaders’
differing
political visions are being exacerbated by tribalism and increasing
religiosity.
Specifically,
this has a severe impact on the effectiveness of the police
service.”
948.
The paper
stated that negative media reporting was “wrong”:
“While
militia rivalry is a fact of life in the Basra police, the
behaviour of the Jameat
police
station … is not representative of the police service as a whole.
Some 70 out
of 240
Jameat officers are pursuing primarily a militia rather than an IPS
agenda.
This should
be set against a total southern police force of around 14,000.
Police
officers
will continue to have dual loyalties to the state on one hand and
militia/tribe
on the
other. It will take five, possibly 10 years to train up a
sufficiently large cadre of
middle
management police officers loyal to state
institutions.”
949.
Although the
Basra Governor and Provincial Council had “refused to do
business
with us”,
their credibility meant that the effect was “not significant”. The
“immediate
problem”
was whether there would be “reprisal” attacks on UK personnel, and
whether
police and
prison mentors could safely be deployed to ISF units. Training
teams had
been
withdrawn from Basra city and some areas beyond, but the British
military were
“back on
the ground visiting police stations”.
950.
On whether the
UK was “on the right policy course”, the paper stated:
“Asserting
direct British control over local
government and rule of [law]
institutions
is out of the question. There is no legal base for this … If, on
the
other hand,
we were to pull out
more rapidly, the
Transitional Government and
security
forces would be unable to fill the vacuum. Militia rivalry would
escalate.
Iran’s
influence would be entirely unchecked. We would be accused of
‘cutting and
running’.
“Our
only realistic option is to maintain our course and see the job
through.
But
we need to
make adjustments to our policy, while
sticking to our strategic
approach of
ensuring in due course successful transition of responsibility for
Rule
of Law in
the South‑East to the Iraqis … We should apply pressure on the
Iraqi
893
Annotated
Agenda, 11 October 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
894
Letter
Hayes to Quarrey, 30 September 2005, ‘Iraq: Basra’ attaching Paper
‘South‑East Iraq: Impact of
Security
Incident in Basra’.
273