10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
877.
The Iraqi
Minister of Displacement and Migration visited the UK from 23 to
27 July,
and agreed
that Iraq and the UK should draw up a Memorandum of
Understanding
(MOU) to
cover returns to Iraq.553
878.
The Occupation
of Iraq formally came to an end on 28 June. Power was
transferred
from the CPA and Iraqi Governing Council to the
IIG.554
879.
On 3 November,
an IPU official provided an update for Mr Straw on
enforced
returns.555
A Home
Office delegation had visited Iraq from 3 to 11 September and
had
“eventually
persuaded” KRG Ministers and officials to accept forced
returns.
The
Minister of Displacement and Migration had not yet signed the MOU.
The Home
Office
believed that forced returns could go ahead without it as, under
the Chicago
Convention,
Iraq had an obligation to take back its nationals who did not
qualify to
remain in
the UK. The Home Office was therefore making plans to send the
first 15 failed
asylum
seekers back to northern Iraq on around 23 November.
880.
The IPU
official advised that the FCO’s view was that no forced returns
should take
place until
the MOU was signed, for three reasons:
•
to ignore
IIG views could generate “ill will” from the IIG and KRG, at a time
when
the UK
needed their support on a number of political
priorities;
•
the planned
destinations for returnees might not be safe; and
•
the
presentational issue of enforced returns coinciding with military
operations
in Fallujah,
and with Ramadan.
881.
Mr Blunkett’s
Private Secretary wrote to No.10 on 15 November, reporting
that
the IIG
accepted the principle of enforced return, but was unlikely to
accept returnees
until the
following year.556
The
Minister of Displacement and Migration had asked for
an
improved
package of assistance for returnees. Mr Blunkett’s Private
Secretary restated
the FCO’s
view that no enforced returns should take place without an MOU,
and
recommended
that the UK should intensify its lobbying to secure the IIG’s
signature to it.
882.
No.10 replied
on 18 November, confirming that Mr Blair agreed that no
enforced
returns
should be made without an MOU.557
883.
Mr Blair
visited Baghdad on 21 December.558
In his record
of Mr Blair’s meeting
with Prime
Minister Ayad Allawi, Mr Quarrey reported that Prime Minister
Allawi had
agreed that
Iraq should sign an MOU covering enforced returns before the end
of
the month.
553
Minute IPU
[junior official] to Straw, 3 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Update on
Enforced Returns’.
554
Bremer LP
III & McConnell M. My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.
Threshold, 2006.
555
Minute IPU
[junior official] to Straw, 3 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Update on
Enforced Returns’.
556
Letter
PS/Blunkett to No.10 [junior official], 15 November 2004, ‘Enforced
Returns to Iraq’.
557
Letter
No.10 [junior official] to PS/Blunkett, 18 November 2004, ‘Enforced
Returns to Iraq’.
558
Letter
Quarrey to Adams, 21 December 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to
Baghdad, 21 December:
Meeting
with Allawi’.
505