The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1157.
On 6
September, the Commission reported that the ISF’s progress was
“uneven”
but “that
there should be increasing improvement in both their readiness and
their
capability
for the internal security of Iraq”. The ISF “would not be able to
secure Iraqi
borders
against conventional military threats in the near term”. Whilst
assessed as
“severely
deficient” in combat support, there was “clear evidence of
developing the
baseline
infrastructure that leads to the successful formation of a national
defense
capability”.
1158.
The Commission
judged that the Iraqi Army was capable of taking over
an
increasing
amount of combat responsibilities from coalition forces, but the
ISF would
be “unable
to fulfil their essential security responsibilities independently
over the next
12‑18 months”.
1159.
The
Commission’s conclusions on the MOI and its forces were less
positive:
“The
Ministry of Interior is a ministry in name only. It is widely
regarded as
being
dysfunctional and sectarian, and suffers from ineffective
leadership. Such
fundamental
flaws present a serious obstacle to achieving the levels of
readiness,
capability,
and effectiveness in police and border security forces that are
essential
for
internal security and stability in Iraq.”
1160.
The Report
went on describe the IPS as “fragile”, “underequipped”
and
“compromised
by militia and insurgent infiltration”, although it assessed that
the IPS
could
improve rapidly should the MOI become more functional. Of the
National Police,
the Report
stated that it was “not viable in its current form”.
1161.
On 10 and 11
September, Gen Petraeus testified to Congress, warning of
the
dangers of
handing over to ISF too early.1094
He did note
that “despite their shortages,
many Iraqi
[Army] units across Iraq now operate with minimal coalition
assistance”.1095
1162.
A Report to
Congress on 14 September stated that, by July 2007, Iraqi
Army
divisions
had been at about 103 percent of authorised strength, but that
masked the
extremely
low proportion that were present for duty.1096
Officer
ranks were a particular
concern,
with manning levels of only 69 percent.
1163.
A Report to
Congress on 14 December 2007 stated that authorised ISF
personnel
numbers
were increasing as a result of three factors:
•
successful
offensive operations and local awakenings providing a new pool
of
recruits in
a wider range of communities;
•
the
incorporation of around 100,000 FPS personnel; and
1094
Testimony
to Congress Petraeus, 10‑11 September 2007, ‘Report to Congress on
the Situation in Iraq’.
1095
Congressional
Hearing, S. HRG. 110‑490, 11 September 2007, ‘Iraq: The
Crocker/Petraeus Report’
1096
Report to
Congress, 14 September 2007, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
326