6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

purposes

638. Reflecting the discussion with Mr Blair on 8 September, Mr Hoon told

Secretary Rumsfeld on 11 September that the UK would not want to offer more

than it could deliver and was therefore expecting to offer maritime and air assets

for any military campaign.

639. MOD planning for a land contribution and discussions with the US

continued.

640. Lt Gen Reith continued to report a military perception that the US wanted

a UK‑led force in the North.

641. In preparation for Mr Hoon’s meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld on 11 September,

Dr Cholerton provided a list of questions seeking clarification on a number of issues.258

He identified Turkey’s attitude and the US perspective on the northern option as “the key

points” on which “more clarity” was needed from the US.

642. In a meeting with Mr Hoon on 11 September, Secretary Rumsfeld raised the

firefighters’ strike.259 Mr Hoon explained that, partly for this reason but also because

“movement of UK ground force assets could become visible prematurely in relation to

the diplomatic/UN process”, the UK would not want to offer more than it could deliver

and was therefore expecting to offer maritime and air assets for any military campaign.

643. On 12 September, Lt Gen Reith submitted further advice to Lt Gen Pigott on

“the UK component options available to contribute to US action in decisive operations

against Iraq”.260

644. Lt Gen Reith provided a detailed analysis of the individual components which

could contribute to the operation and the assumptions surrounding them. He understood

that the Chiefs of Staff were now content with the UK Special Forces, air and maritime

contributions. He focused on the land component, where a decision was “now required”.

A number of factors were considered, of which “US requirements” were judged to be the

“most important”.

645. Lt Gen Reith identified a spectrum of options from the deployment of a Royal

Marine Commando Group with the Amphibious Response Group for operations in the

258 Minute Cholerton to APS/SofS [MOD], 9 September 2002, ‘Iraq – Defence Secretary’s Meeting

with Rumsfeld’.

259 Letter Williams to Manning, 13 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Meeting with Donald Rumsfeld:

11 September 2002’.

260 Minute Reith to DCDS(C), 12 September 2002, ‘Potential UK Contribution to US Operations

Against Iraq’.

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