The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Steers were
needed for Maj Gen Brims and two UK officers in “key
planning
positions”:
Brigadier Albert Whitley (Senior British Land Adviser (SBLA)
at
the Coalition
Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in Kuwait) and
Maj Gen
Cross,130
working to
Lt Gen Garner in ORHA.
268.
The record of
the FCO Iraq Morning Meeting on 6 February stated that: “PJHQ
have
a large
number of practical questions, on which they need urgent policy
guidance.”131
269.
Maj Gen
Whitley told the Inquiry that US Lieutenant General David
McKiernan,
Coalition
Forces Land Component Commander, had initially asked him to lead
on
planning
for “post hostilities” and to be his “eyes and ears” on the subject
with other
headquarters.132
With the
creation of ORHA and the augmentation of CFLCC by
Combined
Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7, the post-invasion military command), Lt
Gen
McKiernan,
who already had deputies for Operations and Support, had felt it
essential
that the
then Brigadier Whitley be given more authority. In mid-February
2003, with
the
agreement of Lt Gen Reith, Lt Gen McKiernan appointed Brigadier
Whitley Deputy
Commanding
General (Post Hostilities), with the rank of (acting) Major
General.
270.
Maj Gen
Whitley told the Inquiry he was instructed to: “Do what you can,
with what
we have and
when we can. Produce a plan for CFLCC for Phase IV.” That plan
came
to be known
as Eclipse II and is described in the Box ‘Eclipse II – the CFLCC
plan for
Phase IV’
later in this Section.
271.
MOD officials
briefed Mr Hoon on the IPU and the Common Document
on
12 February:
“In the UK
officials have set about establishing a bespoke structure that will
provide
policy
guidance on aftermath issues – initially, principally to the UK
military, but also
more widely
…
“Central to
this effort is the Iraq Policy Unit [sic] … Advising this in an
expert capacity
is the Iraq
Aftermath Strategic Planning Group in the MOD. The main effort of
the
IPU is to
populate a document (‘The Iraq Stage IV Subjects Document’) that
is
essentially
a structured list of questions with answers that will allow
departments
to give
policy guidance, and will form a ‘core script’ that will permit our
various
personnel
embedded in US structures to give a unified message on the UK
vision
for
post-conflict Iraq. Many of these are issues of detail, but they
have real practical
import (for
example – whether the US plans to dollarize the Iraqi economy will
affect
the
currency that is issued to 1 Div, who will need to pay contractors
in their AO
[Area of
Operations]).”133
130
The author
of the record was unsure of the name of the individual working to
Lt Gen Garner, but must
have meant
Maj Gen Cross.
131
Minute
Tanfield to PS/PUS [FCO], 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq Morning Meeting:
Key Points’.
132
Statement,
25 January 2011, page 3.
133
Minute
Sec(O) [junior official] to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 12
February 2003, ‘Iraq: Aftermath –
Briefing
for Meeting with OGD Ministers’.
358