The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
241.
The Iraq
Senior Officials Group met on 7 November.91
Mr Forber
and Mr Baker
gave
updates on the Status of Forces Agreement negotiations and the
parallel US
negotiation.
Ms Aldred emphasised the importance of recommendations to
Ministers
being
placed in the current political context, in particular what the
Iraqi Government
wanted and
the information in the recent JIC Assessment. The Cabinet Office
would
draft an
overarching context paper for NSID(OD).
242.
Mr Forber
reported that the Iraqi Government said that it was willing to
agree
a SOFA with
the UK “providing it did not include combat elements”; it was not
clear
whether
that was a firm position or a negotiating tactic. The MOD and the
FCO argued
for an
increase in pressure on the Iraqi Government to persuade them to
accept that
the UK
needed combat troops for a short while into 2009. US support would
be crucial.
243.
Ms Aldred
reported a discussion with Gen Lute about the agreement
between
President
Bush and Mr Brown on the timetable for UK drawdown, and the
possible need
for US help
to agree a SOFA.
244.
The Iraq
Senior Officials Group also discussed a draft post-drawdown
strategy,
particularly
the UK’s energy and commercial objectives and the proposed FCO,
DFID,
MOD and
military presence.
245.
On energy, the
Group agreed that the Department for Energy and Climate
Change
and the FCO
should develop a “coherent and detailed” strategy for Iraq,
including what
sort of
presence would be needed to deliver it. DFID were to consider
further:
“… whether
a presence only in Baghdad supported by a communications
strategy
and
programme funding in the South, would be sufficient to sustain our
legacy there,
protect our
reputation and ensure the US did not win credit for progress that
we had
engineered.”
246.
On 12
November, Mr Prentice reported a “highly successful” visit to
Iraq by
Mr Alexander
the previous week.92
Mr Alexander
met Prime Minister Maliki and
Ambassador
Crocker and attended the launch of the Basra Investment
Commission
(see
Section 10.2).
247.
Prime Minister
Maliki “continued to insist that the UK had done little for Basra”
but
he welcomed
Mr Alexander’s assurances that the UK wanted to move towards a
more
normalised
bilateral relationship, including closer economic, cultural and
educational
links. They
discussed the SOFA, “the success of which would be a fundamental
first step
in the
transition both governments were looking for”.
91
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Aldred, 10 November 2008, ‘Iraq
Senior Officials Group,
7 November’.
92
eGram
45112/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 12 November 2008, ‘Iraq: Visit by
Secretary of State for
International
Development to Baghdad and Basra, 6 November’.
422