The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
what to do
next. And this was the solution to the French worry about
automaticity.
In
practice, we all knew that if Blix were unable to do the job, the
Security Council
would have
to meet to consult. There was thus bound to be a second stage in
the
427.
Sir David
suggested that the resolution might say something to the effect
that the
Security
Council “would consult and decide”. He told Mr de La Sablière
that the “time
had come”
to “talk seriously about texts … We needed to find a way through
quickly.
The price
of failure would go well beyond the immediate Iraq crisis. It would
strike at the
viability
of the UN itself.”
428.
Sir David also
discussed the points with Dr Rice, who told him that President
Bush
and
President Chirac were due to speak later that day.152
429.
FCO Legal
Advisers considered that the draft resolution would not
authorise
the use of
force.
430.
In response to
a request from Mr Edward Chaplin, FCO Director Middle East
and
North
Africa, for his views on a further draft of the resolution, which
stated that if Iraq
failed to
comply fully with its obligations it would “bear full
responsibility for the serious
consequences”
that would follow, Mr Grainger advised on 11 October that
“even read
in the
context of the rest of the draft” that provision “would not in
itself authorise the
431.
Mr Grainger
was concerned that the draft did not use the language of
material
breach of
resolution 687 (1991): “This point is crucial, as it is only a
material breach
of the
cease‑fire terms which permits the revival argument.”
432.
Mr Grainger
added: “If our objective is that the resolution itself authorises
the use
of force”,
amendments would be needed and even then the resolution would need
to be
looked at
as a whole and in the light of any statements made at the time it
was adopted.
433.
Mr Grainger
also raised a question about whether the finding that Iraq
was
in material
breach of OP1 of the draft resolution could be relied on “in
current
circumstances”
to justify the use of force. That would be “difficult to maintain
when the
[other]
provisions … indicate that the Council is itself taking the
responsibility of setting
out the
steps Iraq must follow to remedy those breaches”.
434.
Mr Grainger
warned that the addition of language suggested by Sir
Jeremy
Greenstock,
to the effect that the Council had decided to “remain fully seized
of its
responsibility”,
would in his view have the effect of making it “even clearer that
the
Council was
not authorising the use of force”.
151
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 9 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Jean‑Marc de La Sablière’.
152
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 9 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi
Rice’.
153
Minute
Grainger to Chaplin, 11 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Latest US
Compromise’.
278