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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
what to do next. And this was the solution to the French worry about automaticity.
In practice, we all knew that if Blix were unable to do the job, the Security Council
would have to meet to consult. There was thus bound to be a second stage in the
UN process …”151
427.  Sir David suggested that the resolution might say something to the effect that the
Security Council “would consult and decide”. He told Mr de La Sablière that the “time
had come” to “talk seriously about texts … We needed to find a way through quickly.
The price of failure would go well beyond the immediate Iraq crisis. It would strike at the
viability of the UN itself.”
428.  Sir David also discussed the points with Dr Rice, who told him that President Bush
and President Chirac were due to speak later that day.152
429.  FCO Legal Advisers considered that the draft resolution would not authorise
the use of force.
430.  In response to a request from Mr Edward Chaplin, FCO Director Middle East and
North Africa, for his views on a further draft of the resolution, which stated that if Iraq
failed to comply fully with its obligations it would “bear full responsibility for the serious
consequences” that would follow, Mr Grainger advised on 11 October that “even read
in the context of the rest of the draft” that provision “would not in itself authorise the
use of force”.153
431.  Mr Grainger was concerned that the draft did not use the language of material
breach of resolution 687 (1991): “This point is crucial, as it is only a material breach
of the cease‑fire terms which permits the revival argument.”
432.  Mr Grainger added: “If our objective is that the resolution itself authorises the use
of force”, amendments would be needed and even then the resolution would need to be
looked at as a whole and in the light of any statements made at the time it was adopted.
433.  Mr Grainger also raised a question about whether the finding that Iraq was
in material breach of OP1 of the draft resolution could be relied on “in current
circumstances” to justify the use of force. That would be “difficult to maintain when the
[other] provisions … indicate that the Council is itself taking the responsibility of setting
out the steps Iraq must follow to remedy those breaches”.
434.  Mr Grainger warned that the addition of language suggested by Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, to the effect that the Council had decided to “remain fully seized of its
responsibility”, would in his view have the effect of making it “even clearer that the
Council was not authorising the use of force”.
151 Letter Manning to McDonald, 9 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Jean‑Marc de La Sablière’.
152 Letter Manning to McDonald, 9 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.
153 Minute Grainger to Chaplin, 11 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Latest US Compromise’.
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