The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

easy to justify to public opinion, as criticisms of UK/US air strikes and of the

humanitarian impact of sanctions has shown.”

802.  Addressing future policy, the Joint Memorandum stated:

“However difficult it may become to sustain a policy of containment, it is not clear

what the alternative would be. To simply walk away from the problem would be an

admission of failure, and leave Saddam free to pose once more a major threat to

regional security and British interests. On the other hand, a policy of trying to topple

Saddam would command no useful international support …

“Containment, therefore, remains the only viable option for achieving our policy

objectives. If Iraq complied with UNSCRs, we should then lift sanctions …

“If, on the other hand, Iraq does not co-operate with the UN (let alone comply with

the UNSCRs), we face the prospect of indefinite containment from outside Iraq,

based on sanctions, external monitoring and control, and the threat of military force

if Saddam seeks to threaten his neighbours or reconstitute his WMD capabilities …”

803.  The Joint Memorandum recommended that securing international support would

require a willingness to agree a package of measures “which ‘middle-ground’ UNSC

opinion would regard as reasonable”. It suggested a draft UNSCR, offering a balanced

package based on increasing and improving the “Oil-for-Food” programme, the prospect

of permitting foreign investment in Iraq’s oil infrastructure to increase output, and the

possible suspension of export restrictions in return for co-operation and substantial

progress towards compliance and effective arms control with some prospect of sanctions

lift. The ideal would be an in-country arms control regime but “not at any price”: the UK

should continue to press the US to offer “light at the end of the tunnel”, but not “buy Iraqi

co-operation by prematurely suspending or lifting sanctions”.

804.  The Joint Memorandum concluded that the policy of containment remained the

only viable way to pursue the UK’s policy objectives. Iraq was unlikely to accept the

package immediately but “might be persuaded to acquiesce eventually”.

805.  Ms Clare Short, the International Development Secretary, commented that

containment would not solve the pressing issue of ensuring that the basic needs of the

Iraqi people were met; and that, although there had been “an extensive exchange of

correspondence”, she hoped it would be “possible to have the opportunity to discuss

these very difficult issues with Ministerial colleagues”.313 Mr Phillip Barton, a No.10

Private Secretary, advised Mr Blair that there was no need for a DOP discussion

“unless you [Mr Blair] particularly want one”.314 Mr Blair endorsed the conclusions of

313  Letter Smith to Packenham, 24 May 1999, ‘Iraq, the Way Forward’.

314  Minute Barton to Prime Minister, 27 May 1999, ‘Iraq: Future Strategy’.

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