9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
extension
of the JAM cease-fire was positive while it lasted, but provincial
elections were
essential.
Training of the Iraqi Navy would take at least until
2010.
839.
On 7 March,
Mr Day provided advice to Mr Browne’s Assistant Private
Secretary
on media
handling of the “accommodation” with JAM, specifically whether the
MOD
should
brief the media proactively.412
He
explained that the advice had been requested
by
Mr Browne following a Financial
Times article in
February.
840.
Mr Day
recommended that Mr Browne should agree that the concerns of
PJHQ
and others
were “sufficiently compelling” to justify maintaining “our present
defensive
posture on
this issue”.
841.
Mr Day
wrote that there was a risk that further details of the story would
emerge
and
suggested that the advantage of a proactive briefing would be to
allow the UK:
“… to
explain the rationale and benefits to the UK of the accommodation
and set
out the
facts of the case accurately rather than allowing stories based on
between-
cell
whispers to stand unchallenged. Most journalists regard the basic
principle of
reconciliation
as nothing new and any ‘deal’ that has been struck as a sensible
step.”
842.
On the other
hand, there was a concern about the risk to JAM1 personally,
and
“that
disclosure would pose a risk to the accommodation itself, including
the political
process in
Basra, and could lead to increased IDF attacks”. They were
therefore
opposed to
“proactive briefing of any kind in current
circumstances”:
“Presentationally,
there is a risk that the recent rise in IDF attacks on the COB,
and
last
weekend’s fatality, would call into question the long-term benefit
to the UK of
the
accommodation, and generate unhelpful debate over the partial truce
at a time
when the
political situation in Basra remains finely balanced … It is also
possible,
given that
we invoked DA [Defence Advisory] Notice procedures with the FT,
that we
could be
accused of publicising those details that suit us while suppressing
those
that do not.”
“It will
come out in more detail eventually, and we will need at that stage
to put
our case
quickly and strongly. I have asked PJHQ and DJC [Directorate of
Joint
Commitments]
to review our lines accordingly. SofS may also wish to
consider
briefing
the Opposition on Privy Council terms.”
844.
Lieutenant
General Lloyd Austin, who had succeeded Lt Gen Odierno
as
Commanding
General MNC-I, visited Basra on 8 March and shared his concerns
about
412
Minute Day
to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 7 March 2008, ‘Accommodation with
Jaish Al Mahdi –
Media
Handling’.
413
Minute
White-Spunner to CJO, 13 March 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter –
13 March 2008’.
337