9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
74.
Mr Ricketts
also observed that, as a draft resolution had yet to be agreed with
the
US, the
series of meetings about to begin across Europe would not be
negotiating
resolution
text. Mr Straw would nonetheless be meeting his German, Russian,
French
and Spanish
counterparts.
75.
Mr Blair sent
President Bush two Notes on 31 March, one on
communications,
which is
described in Section 8, and one entitled
‘Reconstruction’.34
76.
The Note on
reconstruction covered the two funds proposed by the US
to
administer
oil revenues/unblocked Iraqi assets and donor funds, run by the IMF
and
World Bank
respectively. Mr Blair wrote that using IFIs was sensible but that
this
arrangement
would run into problems because:
•
channelling
oil revenues to IFIs rather than the IIA could be
“misrepresented”
and the
proposal would need to be included in the next
resolution;
•
without UN
agreement the IFIs were unlikely to agree and this would
“replicate
UN problems
inside those two organisations”;
•
the UK,
Japan and others could only unblock assets with UN authority;
and
•
“our
posture should be for the IIA to take on responsibility as soon as
possible,
ie Iraq for
the Iraqis, not us or the UN”.
77.
Mr Blair
described an amended proposal submitted by the Treasury, in which
some
oil
revenues went into the OFF programme, and the remainder (plus
assets and donor
funds) into
a reconstruction account handled by the IMF and World Bank. Funds
from
both
accounts would be “directed to the IIA”. Any proposals would need
to be tailored in
a way that
could secure UN endorsement. Mr Blair wrote that he did “not think
we can
dodge this
point” and said that the key to achieving that was “getting the
right Special
Co-ordinator”
in order to avoid becoming bogged down in UN
bureaucracy.
78.
In response to
a request from Mr Straw’s Private Office for material on
Iraqi
attitudes
to the US and possible implications for UK policy, Mr Simon Fraser,
FCO
Director
for Strategy and Innovation, wrote on 31 March:
“We need to
understand the history and experiences of the people of Iraq as
well
as the
nature of the regime …
…
“Most
ordinary Iraqis may loathe Saddam: but they may by now be so
politically
disorientated
as not to believe that an alternative is possible.
34
Letter
Manning to Rice, 31 March 2003, [untitled] attaching
Notes [Blair to Bush], [undated],
‘Reconstruction’
and ‘Communications’.
143