3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
the Iraqi
regime was deeply embarrassed”. He also argued that people would
“think
about it
differently once they see the evidence”.
257.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diary on 3 September:
“The
hardest [question] was: ‘Why now? What was it that we knew now that
we
didn’t
before that made us believe we had to do it now?’ It was not going
to be at all
easy to
sell the policy in the next few months …”85
258.
Mr Campbell
added that announcing the publication of the dossier would
“raise
expectations
massively. Today was about beginning to turn the tide of public
opinion and
it was
going to be very tough indeed.”
259.
Mr Campbell
told the Inquiry that the decision to bring forward the publication
of
the dossier
was a way of trying to calm the situation.86
Mr Blair
had wanted “to set out
for the
public, in as accessible a way as possible, the reasons why he had
become more
concerned”
about Iraq.
260.
The decision
to publish the dossier and its preparation is addressed in
Section 4.2.
That also
sets out the separate work in the FCO on a script addressing why
the problem
of Iraq’s
WMD, unlike other countries’ programmes including Iran’s, could not
be
resolved
through containment and diplomacy.
261.
A JIC
Assessment reviewing Iraq’s manipulation of its trade relations
to
obtain
diplomatic support was issued on 3 September.
262.
An Assessment
analysing the way in which Iraq used trade to exert
influence,
‘Iraqi Trade:
A Tool of Influence’, was issued at the request of the JIC on 3
September.87
263.
The Key
Judgements were:
“•
Iraq is
successful in manipulating its trade relations to obtain diplomatic
support
from other
countries. It will continue to do so. The weakness of the
economies
of many of
Iraq’s neighbours means they will continue to be susceptible to
Iraqi
pressure
through the offer of lucrative trading opportunities.
•
Trade
dependency has muted, but not eliminated, criticism of Iraq by
its
neighbours
– whose policies are influenced but not determined by
economic
factors.
85
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown
to
Iraq.
Hutchinson, 2012.
86
Public
hearing, 12 January 2010, pages 66‑67.
87
JIC
Assessment, 3 September 2002, ‘Iraqi Trade: A Tool of
Influence’.
139