8 | The
invasion
broad
international agenda and to tackle the Middle East Peace
Plan.145
Mr Blair
gave
Mr Bush
a note addressing those issues, which is described in Section
9.1.
233.
On the
military operation in Iraq, Mr Blair emphasised the impact
that the liberation
of Basra
would have. It would “signify that we had broken the power of the
paramilitaries,
and taken
control of Iraq’s second city. This would have enormous resonance”.
He did
not want to
“second-guess the military commanders”, but there were “very
strong
political
attractions in liberating Basra for the signal it would send to the
Iraqi people”.
234.
Mr Blair
also told President Bush that he did not want his visit to Camp
David to
focus
primarily on a UN resolution to deal with post-conflict Iraq: “The
time to debate this
would come
when we had secured victory, and were in a position of
strength”.
235.
The wider
discussion is addressed in Section 9.1.
236.
The COBR
update sent to Sir David Manning on 27 March reported that
a
perception
of weak Coalition air attacks may have raised regime
morale.146
The
update also
reported the view of the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) that
“there is little
prospect of
a significant uprising [in Basra], until the local population is
convinced of the
Coalition’s
intent and capability to remove the regime”. The Red Crescent was
active in
Basra. Poor
weather in southern Iraq continued to hamper air operations and a
number
of sorties
were cancelled.
237.
In
preparation for a discussion with colleagues about the
significance
of Basra
for the wider campaign strategy, Mr Hoon was advised
that
Gen McKiernan’s
focus was the fall of Baghdad.
238.
In a minute to
Mr Hoon’s Private Office on 27 March for a meeting with
“Cabinet
colleagues”
that day, the Deputy Head of Policy/Operations at PJHQ provided
advice
on the
significance of Basra within the wider campaign
strategy.147
239.
Mr Hoon
was advised that:
“… regime
removal is at the heart of the Coalition’s objectives … The US
campaign
plan
identified Baghdad as the centre of gravity for achieving these,
and our other
objectives.
It has always been McKiernan’s … understanding that at some stage
it
would be
necessary to take Baghdad, and that the entry of an attacking
division into
Baghdad
would be a strategically decisive point in the campaign. The same
cannot
be said of
any other area (including Basra). Hence it has long been the US
plan …
to advance
north as rapidly as possible, and reach Baghdad in the shortest
possible
time
(around 12 days, according to Gen Franks …).”
145
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 28 March 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with
President Bush at Camp
David:
Dinner on 26 March’.
146
Minute
Gibbons to Manning, 27 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Update’.
147
Minute Dep
Hd Pol/Ops(ME) to PS/SofS [MOD], 27 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Basra –
Coalition Campaign
Strategy’.
41