4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
“deemed too
dangerous”. Eight intact bombs had been unearthed, two of
which
had a
“liquid fill”. That “should be followed by a serious and credible
effort to
determine”
how many R-400 bombs had been produced.
•
Iraq had
informed UNMOVIC that there would be further legislation
on
prohibiting
work on weapons of mass destruction.
419.
Dr
ElBaradei reported that there were no indications that Iraq had
resumed
nuclear
activities since the inspectors left in December 1998 and the
recently
increased
level of Iraqi co-operation should allow the IAEA to provide the
Security
Council
with an assessment of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities in the near
future.
420.
Dr ElBaradei
reported that the IAEA was focused on the “central
question”
of “whether
Iraq has revived, or attempted to revive, its defunct nuclear
weapons
programme
over the last four years”.158
Dr
ElBaradei noted that:
“… in the
past three weeks, possibly as a result of ever-increasing pressure
by the
international
community, Iraq has been forthcoming in its co-operation,
particularly
with regard
to the conduct of private interviews and in making available
evidence
that could
contribute to the resolution of matters of IAEA
concern.”
421.
That “should
enable” the IAEA “in the very near future to provide the
Security
Council
with an objective and thorough assessment of Iraq’s
nuclear-related
capabilities”.
422.
Iraq’s
industrial capacity had deteriorated sharply, including through the
departure
of foreign
support present in the 1980s and large numbers of skilled Iraqi
personnel in
the
preceding decade.
423.
Interviews
were continuing, including two “private interviews in the last 10
days”.
Interviews
outside Iraq might be the best way to ensure that interviews were
“free”, and
the IAEA
intended to request such interviews “shortly”.
424.
The primary
technical focus of the IAEA in the field had been on the
possible
resumption
of Iraq’s efforts to enrich uranium. In relation to the three key
issues,
the IAEA
had:
•
Failed to
uncover any evidence that Iraq’s attempts to purchase high
strength
aluminium
tubes was for “any project other than … rockets”. The
documents
provided
and interviews had allowed the IAEA “to develop a coherent picture
of
attempted
purchases and intended usage”.
•
Verified
that none of the magnets Iraq had declared could be used
directly
for the
magnetic bearings in centrifuges. It was likely that Iraq possessed
the
expertise
to manufacture such magnets and the IAEA would continue to
monitor
and inspect
equipment and materials.
158
UN Security
Council, ‘4714th Meeting Friday 7 March 2003’
(S/PV.4714).
367