The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
887.
In his update
on Iraq on 8 June, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary said that DOP
would
need to
take a decision shortly on the timing of a withdrawal from Basra
Palace:
“Within the
MOD, a view is emerging that leaving there would reduce our
situational
awareness
to the extent that we would fairly rapidly lose all ability to
generate
military
effect; we would also probably have to pull out of the PJCC
[Provincial Joint
Co‑ordination
Centre], where we undertake ISF training.”486
888.
Attached to
the update was a paper by the IPU on the situation outside
MND(SE)
and
Baghdad, as requested by Mr Blair on 25 May.487
It said
that Babil, Wasit, Karbala
and
Qadisiyah were “generally stable” but that Salah ad Din and Ninawa
were
experiencing
“major sectarian and ethnic tensions” and it was uncertain whether
they
would be
judged to have met the standards for transition to
PIC.
889.
On 11 June,
Mr Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and
Mr Browne made
a joint
visit to Baghdad and met a number of key individuals, including the
Prime Minister
and
President, Gen Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker and
Mr Asquith.488
890.
Mr Gordon
Brown told Prime Minister Maliki that:
“… the UK
was keen to support the Prime Minister on changes to the
Constitution,
new laws
and reforms and economic infrastructure and support.”
891.
On Basra,
Prime Minister Maliki “promised rapid progress”,
specifically:
“… a new
chief of police in two days, a new Governor within the week,
appoint
a new
General to take overall charge of security …”
892.
President
Talabani assessed that the Baghdad Security Plan had produced
“a
slight
improvement but he had hoped for better”. Gen Petraeus highlighted
a “steadily
falling
sectarian murder rate” and produced a chart which showed a drop
from 1,474 in
January to
599 in May.
893.
In response to
a question about his September report to Congress, Gen
Petraeus
said:
“… the key
point was that even if sectarianism could be tackled all of the
other
issues
remained: Iran, AQ, the weak borders, Sadr and the state of the
Iraqi Security
Forces.”
894.
A note of the
meeting prepared by Mr Brown’s Private Office observed that
“despite
reported US
concerns, there was a notable silence on Basra issues other than to
confirm
PIC was
going to be a difficult call”.
486
Minute
Banner to Prime Minister, 8 June 2007, ‘Iraq Update, 8
June’.
487
Paper IPU,
8 June 2007, ‘Iraq: Situation Outside MND (SE) and
Baghdad’.
488
Letter
Bowler to Banner, 13 June 2007, ‘The Chancellor and Defence
Secretary’s Visit to Baghdad’
attaching
Paper [unattributed], [undated], ‘The Visit of the Chancellor of
the Exchequer and Defence
Secretary
to Baghdad: 11 June 2007’.
166