The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
there could
be outbreaks of street fighting on a large scale … Delays to the
elections
might also
provoke violence and civil unrest.
“IV.
Economic initiatives such as job creation schemes and
reconstruction projects
have the
potential to reinforce Iraq’s security gains and promote
reconciliation. But
there is
little prospect of change in the South in 2008. Perceptions that
conditions
are not
improving fast enough could erode popular consent for local and
national
authority.
“V. The
Iraqi security forces’ (ISF) ability and willingness to maintain
security in the
south
remains patchy and dependent on MNF training, logistic and
specialist air
support.
Radical improvements in police effectiveness are unlikely. The army
will
remain at
the forefront in providing security … The Iraqis would only call
for MNF
troop
re-intervention as a last resort.
“VI.
Violent criminality, murders, kidnappings, score-settling and
intimidation will
remain part
of life in southern Iraq. Pressure from national Shia political and
religious
leaders …
may limit the scope of unrest. But local ISF action,
accommodations
between the
ISF and elements of JAM, and the perception of MNF willingness
to
intervene
will also remain crucial tools for managing
instability.”
822.
The JIC
reported that although reliable data for attacks against non-MNF
targets
was
lacking, in Basra City alone there had been about 80 murders and 40
kidnappings.
Accounts in
the media suggested that Shia milita were increasingly punishing
and
sometimes
killing women for “contravening strict interpretations of Islamic
mores”.
Around 10
women were reportedly murdered each month in Basra
City.
823.
Mr Brown
discussed Iraq with President Bush on 28 February and observed
that
the
situation in Basra had been more difficult in recent weeks, despite
an extension of
the JAM
cease-fire.401
They
discussed the strategies that had worked in the north of
Iraq,
in
particular mobilising grassroots tribal support.
824.
Mr Brown
indicated that he had pressed the Iraqi Government on ratification
of the
budget and
election laws.
825.
Mr Brown
explained that the UK would “in time” be reviewing troop numbers,
but
would await
the next report by Gen Petraeus in April before taking
decisions.
826.
In his weekly
report on 29 February, Maj Gen White-Spunner considered
that
the impact
of an extension to the freeze on JAM operations was likely to be a
further
splintering
of JAM.402
There were
reports of a new hardline commander of JAM in Basra,
who was
expected to take an aggressive stance towards confronting the ISF,
though he
seemed
likely to maintain the freeze by not attacking the
MNF.
401
Letter
Fletcher to Gould, 28 February 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
Bush, 28 February’.
402
Minute
White-Spunner to CJO, 29 February 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter
–
21 [sic]
February 2008’.
334