6.3 | Military equipment (pre-conflict)

Mr Hoon had “again” run through the three options and “alerted Mr Brown to the likely

broad order costs of Package 2”.

188. Mr Hoon and Mr Brown had also agreed to “meet periodically thereafter so that

Mr Hoon could keep Mr Brown in touch with our emerging thinking on the options for

UK involvement in any military action and the implications for UORs”.86

189. On 13 September, Dr Simon Cholerton, a junior official in Secretariat (Overseas)

(Sec(O)), advised Mr Hoon on “the need to take forward essential UOR work” for

potential operations in Iraq.87 Mr Hoon was asked to:

• Note “that we have got as far as we can in defining urgent equipment and

sustainability measures without consulting more widely” and the “very limited

nature of our consultation and the broad scope of the packages on the table”

meant that “we cannot have high confidence in the judgements we have made”.

• Agree that the MOD should take forward “a limited package of ‘ambiguous’

tasks on 16 essential UORs” aimed at remaining “invisible” but with enough

information to approach the Treasury.

• Note that “these tasks do not cover the full range of capability shortfalls which

have been identified” and work was needed on a wider set of UORs “as soon as

the ‘invisibility’ constraint was lifted” to inform the Treasury. It would require “a

limited expansion” of the Centurion Group.

190. The 16 essential UOR “showstoppers” covered all three packages. That included

NBC protection where there was a requirement to “improve” Individual Protective

Equipment, Collective Protection (COLPRO) and NBC detection. Dr Cholerton explained

that, for all three Services, the issue was “not so much that we do not hold equipment

(capability exists), but whether we hold sufficient in the face of the risk”.

191. Dr Cholerton wrote that six measures were essential for the land component,

notwithstanding the uncertainty over which package would be adopted. That included

desertisation of armoured vehicles and the procurement of additional Enhanced Combat

Body Armour (ECBA), of which only 13,345 sets were available against a potential

deployment of 47,000 personnel. Existing ECBA stocks would be sufficient to equip only

the front line fighting troops. That would “leave support staff – who will nevertheless

potentially face a high risk environment – less well protected”.

192. On 16 September, Mr Hoon received advice on preparatory work to take forward

“a small number of time-critical” UORs for Special Forces.88

86 Minute Watkins to DG RP, 18 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Meeting with the Chancellor: 23 September’.

87 Minute Cholerton to PS/SofS [MOD], 13 September 2002, ‘Iraq – Urgent Operational Requirements

(UORs)’.

88 Minute Sec(HSF)2 to PS/SofS [MOD], 16 September 2002, ‘ OP ROW: SF Urgent Operational

Requirements’.

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