The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
not fully
aware of the access and background of key informants, and
could
not therefore
read their material against the background of an
understanding
of their
motivations for passing on
information.”356
667.
The Butler
Report also addressed the fact that the SIS report of 11
September
had been
given a very restricted circulation and drew attention to
the:
“…
evidence of
difficulties that arose from the unduly strict
‘compartmentalisation’
of intelligence which meant
that experts in DIS did not
have access
to an intelligence report which became available in September
2002
and played
a major role for the JIC in confirming previous intelligence
reports that
Iraq was
producing chemical and biological weapons.”357
668.
Sir Richard
Dearlove told the Butler Review that:
“… SIS were
concerned to minimise knowledge of the existence of the source
during
what they
expected to be an initial, very sensitive, period of development.
The
source’s
intelligence about chemical weapons production was therefore
distributed
to an
extremely limited circle of senior readers.”358
669.
The Butler
Report stated that:
•
It
understood “SIS’s concern to give maximum protection to their
source in those
particular,
and transitional, circumstances”.
•
It had been
“told that in-house SIS technical experts took a preliminary
and
provisional
view that the report should be issued, as being from
‘A new
source
on
trial’”.
•
“But the
exclusion of Dr Jones and his staff from readership of the
original
report
meant that this intelligence was not seen by the few people in the
UK
intelligence
community able to form all-round, professional technical
judgements
on its
reliability and significance.”359
670.
The Butler
Report added:
“•
We
recognise that circumstances arise in which it is right for senior
officials to
take a
broad view that differs from the opinions of those with expertise
on points
of
detail.
•
We do not,
however, consider that the report held back from Dr Jones
and
his staff
(which Dr Jones’s superiors regarded as justifying the certainty
of
356
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
456.
357
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
452.
358
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
574.
359
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
575.
242