The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“As ever,
we do not rely on the good faith of Saddam Hussein. He has none.
We
know,
however, that under the threat of force, we can make him move. We
will be
watching
him with extreme care and a high degree of scepticism … we and
the
Americans
remain ready, willing and able to go back to the use of force at
any time.
There will
be no further warnings. The inspectors will now carry out their
work.”
629.
Mr Blair
emphasised that the position was different from that in February
1998.
There was
“now a very clear diplomatic basis for action without further need
for long
discussion
in the Security Council or elsewhere”. If there was “a next time …
everyone
will know
what to expect … I shall have no hesitation in ordering the use of
force.”
“This is
far from over. It is merely in a different phase. Our course is
set: complete
compliance
and nothing less, and we shall not be moved from that
course.”
631.
Mr William
Hague, the Leader of the Opposition, asked whether, given
Saddam
Hussein’s
“continued breaches of faith, and the continuing threat to peace
that he
presents to
the whole of the Middle East and thus to the interests of the
United
Kingdom”,
meant that, although there would be “formidable difficulties”, the
“prime
objective
of western policy should now be the removal of Saddam from
power?”
“Of course
we want to see the Iraqi people governed by a regime other than
that
of Saddam
Hussein. We are looking with the Americans at ways in which we
can
bolster the
opposition and improve the possibility of removing Saddam
Hussein
altogether.
I entirely share the sentiments that President Clinton expressed
on
that point.”
633.
In a press
conference on 14 December looking at the challenges ahead
in
the coming
year, asked whether Iraq deserved a comprehensive review,
Mr Annan
responded
that the Security Council itself “would want to know, after eight
years of
sanctions,
where it stands, what has been achieved, what needs to be done, and
within
what
reasonable time frame it can be done”.255
634.
Asked about
“any inherent conflict of interest” between multilateral interests
in the
UN and the
US, Mr Annan stated that there were “areas” where Washington’s
policies
diverged
from the UN, including:
“… Iraq,
where the Council has made it clear that we should disarm Iraq, and
the
moment we
get the indication from the inspectors … that Iraq has been
disarmed,
sanctions
will be lifted. American policy goes beyond that, but I am guided
only by
the United
Nations policy.”
255
UN Press
Release, 14 December 1998, ‘Transcript of Press Conference by
Secretary-General Kofi
Annan at
Headquarters, 14 December’ (SG/SM/6837).
142