3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
in dealing
with Iraq, the greater the chance of resolving other crises,
particularly
Israel/Palestine.
530.
In the
discussion over dinner, Mr Blair said there were three issues
at stake:
•
The
authority of the UN. That was
set out in resolution 1441 passed after
twelve
years of Iraqi prevarication. The UN had made clear this was a
final
opportunity
requiring full compliance. In neither the December declaration
nor
Dr Blix’s
reports to the Security Council in January and February was there
any
sign of
full compliance on substance. If there were 100 percent Iraqi
compliance,
the
inspectors could take as long as they needed. But the inspectors
were not
supposed to
be a detective agency. Co-operation was key. If we were not
careful
we would be
back in the situation we were in in the nineties.
•
Iraq’s
WMD. There was
no intelligence agency of any member state which
did not
know Iraq possessed these weapons. It was true that conflict
meant
bloodshed.
But it was not true that the absence of conflict meant the absence
of
bloodshed.
Thousands of Iraqis were dying under Saddam Hussein. Four
million
were in
exile. The rate of Iraqi infant mortality in areas outside Saddam’s
control
was a
quarter of that in areas under Baghdad’s rule.
•
EU/US
relations. Iraq had
to be resolved in a way which met the objective of
maintaining
EU/US relations. That did not mean the EU had to do things
simply
because the
US wanted. The way Europe handled Iraq would have
profound
implications
for generations to come. The key was to ensure resolution
1441
was
implemented. “The UN had to be the way of dealing with this issue,
not
a way
of avoiding it.”145
531.
The Council
statement agreed at the dinner left the decision on inspectors’
time
and
resources to the UN Security Council and made it clear that
immediate action was
needed by
Iraq.146
It was seen
by the media as more robust than expected.
532.
The statement
said that the European Council was “determined to deal
effectively
with the
threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”; and that
it was
“committed
to the United Nations remaining at the centre of the international
order”.
The
European Council recognised that “the primary responsibility for
dealing with Iraqi
disarmament
lies with the Security Council”; and it pledged its “full support”.
It wanted
to achieve
disarmament peacefully, and that was what the people of Europe
wanted:
“War is not
inevitable. Force should only be used as a last resort. It is for
the Iraqi regime
to end this
crisis …”
145
Telegram
179 UKREP Brussels to FCO London, 18 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Special
European Council,
17 February:
Dinner Discussion’.
146
Council of
the European Union, 21 February 2003, Extraordinary
European Council Brussels,
17 February
2003.
275