1.2 | Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September 2001

a joint response. Officials met on 2 and 5 February and draft responses were prepared

and circulated.87

152. Mr McKane judged that the difficulty in providing the Attorney General with

the “clear and definitive assessment” he had requested was sufficiently important

to bring to the attention of the Cabinet Secretary.

153. On 2 February, Mr McKane advised Sir Richard Wilson’s Private Office that it was

proving extremely difficult to provide the Attorney General with the “clear and definitive

assessment” that he had requested of the consequences of ceasing operations in the

southern NFZ.88

154. Mr McKane stated that the consequences of having to cease operations would be

“very serious and far reaching, not only for the defence of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia but

also the transatlantic relationship”.

155. Mr Hoon and Mr Brian Wilson, the newly appointed FCO Minister of State for the

Middle East, met Lord Williams on 5 February to discuss the issue.

156. Mr Sawers advised Mr Blair on 7 February:

“We (including Geoff Hoon, and FCO and MOD officials) were close to satisfying the

Attorney’s concerns with a letter which showed that the northern and southern NFZs

were linked – if we stopped in the South, we would have difficulty persuading Turkey

to agree to continued patrols in the North; and that there was an unacceptably

high risk of humanitarian crisis (i.e. somewhere in Iraq) if we stopped patrolling

the southern NFZ. But Robin [Cook] has refused to endorse the argumentation,

and if the link between the two NFZs is removed, as he wishes, we are unlikely to

persuade Gareth [Lord Williams]. Our planes would then have to stop patrols [of the

southern NFZ] forthwith.”89

157. A meeting with Mr Cook and Mr Hoon had been arranged for the following day.

In the meantime “enforcement action is on hold, and an already once-delayed strike

has been put back a second time”.

158. The Inquiry has not seen a record of that meeting.

159. Mr McKane wrote to Mr Brummell on 8 February, in response to his letter to

Mr Patey of 2 February.90 Mr McKane advised that the response had been “endorsed

by the Foreign and Defence Secretaries”, and stated that:

87 Letter McKane to Goulty, 2 February 2001, ‘Iraq’; Letter McKane to Webb, 2 February 2001, ‘Iraq’;

Letter McKane to Cowper-Coles, 6 February 2001, ‘Iraq’.

88 Minute McKane to Abel, 2 February 2001, ‘Iraq’.

89 Minute Sawers to Prime Minister, 7 February 2001, ‘Iraq’.

90 Letter McKane to Brummell, 8 February 2001, ‘Iraq’.

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