The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“III.
Across the South, there is no strong administrative machinery to
promote
security
and stability …
“IV. The
Iraqi security forces can cope with the low level of threat posed
by the Sunni
Arab
nationalist insurgents and jihadists. Their readiness to deal with
the activities
of Shia
extremists or intra-Shia violence is more uncertain. Army command,
control
and
logistics capabilities are all still developing, making major
operations without
MNF support
difficult. The police are a greater concern: they have multiple
loyalties
and have
taken sides in intra-Shia clashes. A minority of police,
particularly in Basra,
is involved
in attacks on the MNF, the assassination of Sunnis and organised
crime.”
610.
The JIC
considered the background, motives and objectives of Muqtada
al-Sadr
611.
The JIC judged
that al-Sadr had emerged from the December election
with
“great
political clout” because Prime Minister Ja’afari depended on him to
secure
his nomination.
612.
In terms of
motivation, the JIC assessed:
“Sadr’s
overriding priority is to increase his own power. He probably wants
to
be a
leading Shia religious authority, above party politics but able to
influence
key
government policies. He has a genuine desire to see (and get credit
for)
improvements
in the quality of life for his core constituency; his declared
goals also
include:
maintaining the unity of Iraq and delaying federalism; ensuring the
centrality
of religion
in politics; and securing a timetable for the departure of
‘occupation forces’.”
613.
The majority
of JAM members were, in the JIC’s judgement, loyal to
al-Sadr’s
directives,
but a minority were under no effective control and continued to
attack
the MNF.
614.
The JIC
assessed that al-Sadr had consistently refused direct contact
with
representatives
of the coalition and judged that this reluctance was “unlikely to
change
in the
foreseeable future”.
615.
In his weekly
report on 19 March, Lt Gen Fry reported that the MNF-I
command
group had
“wargamed” the implications of a “genuine civil war” in
Iraq.297
616.
The command
group had concluded that civil war was not inevitable; a
properly
constituted
government of national unity could still defuse sectarian tension.
But the
longer Iraq
continued without such a government, the more likely civil war
became.
Empirical
evidence of civil war was growing but not yet conclusive. The level
of violence
296
JIC
Assessment, 16 March 2006, ‘Muqtada al-Sadr’.
297
Minute Fry
to CDS, 19 March 2006, ‘SBMR-I Weekly Report (203) 19 March 06’
attaching Paper
“Civil War”.
590