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6.3  |  Military equipment (pre-conflict)
319.  In describing the modifications that the Challenger 2 was undergoing for Iraq,
Mr Williams wrote that Lord Bach’s comments were “reasonable: although the full
planned upgrade may not be completed in time, Challenger 2s’ desert performance
should have been enhanced to a useful degree in the right timeframe”.
320.  Mr Williams added that, more generally, it was also “important to try and dampen
down speculation” on when equipment modifications were likely to be completed
because:
the MOD’s “general line” was that decisions about military action had “not yet
been taken”, and providing indications that it was “working to a hard and fast
deadline” would “undermine that overall public position on the timing of possible
action”;
the timeframes for delivery from industry were subject to change; and
the MOD’s own assumptions about the timeframe “may again change”.
321.  Mr Williams suggested that should be considered in light of the broader advice
Lord Bach was expecting later that week.
322.  Lord Bach received the advice, submitted on behalf of AM Stirrup, on
24 January.155 He was invited to note that:
137 equipment UORs and 108 sustainability UORs had been approved,
the “vast majority” of which remained “on track to deliver to the Front Line
Commands in accordance with planned ISDs”.
“The compression of timescales for the Land Component, coupled with the
late addition of 16 AA Bde [16 Air Assault Brigade] and the increase in the
Amphibious Task Group to a Brigade(-) has meant that a number of UORs will
not be delivered in full prior to the potential start date of operations.”
“None of the shortfalls is deemed to be a ‘showstopper’ and solutions for
mitigating the potential operational risks involved are being developed by PJHQ
and Front Line Commands.”
“Heavy pressure” would be placed on the supply and equipment support chains
and advanced deployment dates had “added to the weight of UOR items which
were always intended to be fitted in theatre”.
323.  The advice explained that the majority of UOR shortfalls affected ground forces.
The key areas of concerns were the Challenger 2 desertisation, Combat ID and
in-service stock items that could not be procured through UOR action, such as
COLPRO filters for AFVs.
155  Minute DCDS(EC) to PS/Minister(DP), 24 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC UORs’.
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