6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
319.
In describing
the modifications that the Challenger 2 was undergoing for
Iraq,
Mr Williams
wrote that Lord Bach’s comments were “reasonable: although the
full
planned
upgrade may not be completed in time, Challenger 2s’ desert
performance
should have
been enhanced to a useful degree in the right
timeframe”.
320.
Mr Williams
added that, more generally, it was also “important to try and
dampen
down
speculation” on when equipment modifications were likely to be
completed
because:
•
the MOD’s
“general line” was that decisions about military action had “not
yet
been
taken”, and providing indications that it was “working to a hard
and fast
deadline”
would “undermine that overall public position on the timing of
possible
action”;
•
the
timeframes for delivery from industry were subject to change;
and
•
the MOD’s
own assumptions about the timeframe “may again
change”.
321.
Mr Williams
suggested that should be considered in light of the broader
advice
Lord Bach
was expecting later that week.
322.
Lord Bach
received the advice, submitted on behalf of AM Stirrup,
on
24 January.155
He was
invited to note that:
•
137
equipment UORs and 108 sustainability UORs had been
approved,
the “vast
majority” of which remained “on track to deliver to the Front
Line
Commands in
accordance with planned ISDs”.
•
“The
compression of timescales for the Land Component, coupled with
the
late
addition of 16 AA Bde [16 Air Assault Brigade] and the increase in
the
Amphibious
Task Group to a Brigade(-) has meant that a number of UORs
will
not be
delivered in full prior to the potential start date of
operations.”
•
“None of
the shortfalls is deemed to be a ‘showstopper’ and solutions
for
mitigating
the potential operational risks involved are being developed by
PJHQ
and Front
Line Commands.”
•
“Heavy
pressure” would be placed on the supply and equipment support
chains
and
advanced deployment dates had “added to the weight of UOR items
which
were always
intended to be fitted in theatre”.
323.
The advice
explained that the majority of UOR shortfalls affected ground
forces.
The key
areas of concerns were the Challenger 2 desertisation, Combat ID
and
in-service
stock items that could not be procured through UOR action, such
as
COLPRO filters
for AFVs.
155
Minute
DCDS(EC) to PS/Minister(DP), 24 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC
UORs’.
49