7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
105.
In his
statement to Parliament on 24 September and in his answers
to
subsequent
questions, Mr Blair presented Iraq’s past, current and
potential future
capabilities
as evidence of the severity of the potential threat from Iraq’s
weapons
of mass
destruction. He said that at some point in the future that threat
would
become a
reality.
106.
Mr Blair
wrote his statement to the House of Commons himself and chose
the
arguments
to make clear his perception of the threat and why he believed that
there
was an
“overwhelming” case for action to disarm Iraq.38
107.
Addressing the
question of why Saddam Hussein had decided in
mid-September,
but not
before, to admit the weapons inspectors, Mr Blair stated that
the answer was in
the
dossier, and it was because:
“… his
chemical, biological and nuclear programme is not an historic
left-over from
1998. The
inspectors are not needed to clean up the old remains. His
weapons
of mass
destruction programme is active detailed and growing. The policy
of
containment
is not working. The weapons of mass destruction programme is
not
shut down;
it is up and running now.”
108.
Mr Blair
posed, and addressed, three questions: “Why Saddam?”; “Why
now?”;
and “Why
should Britain care?”
109.
On the
question “Why Saddam?”, Mr Blair said that two things about
Saddam
Hussein
stood out: “He had used these weapons in Iraq” and thousands had
died, and
he had used
them during the war with Iran “in which 1 million people died”; and
the
regime had
“no moderate elements to appeal to”.
110.
On the
question “Why now?”, Mr Blair stated:
“I agree I
cannot say that this month or next, even this year or next, Saddam
will
use his
weapons. But I can say that if the international community, having
made
the call
for his disarmament, now, at this moment, at the point of decision,
shrugs
its
shoulders and walks away, he will draw the conclusion dictators
faced with a
weakening
will always draw: that the international community will talk but
not act,
will use
diplomacy but not force. We know, again from our history, that
diplomacy
not backed
by the threat of force has never worked with dictators and never
will.”
111.
There were
significant differences between the US and UK positions,
and
between
them and China, France and Russia about the substance of the
strategy
to be
adopted, including the role of the Security Council in determining
whether
peaceful
means had been exhausted and the use of force to secure
disarmament
was
justified.
38
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
24 September 2002, columns 1-23.
585