9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
34.
Prime Minister
Maliki announced on 18 June that Muthanna would transfer
to
Provincial
Iraqi Control (PIC) on 13 July.31
There was a
lot of work still to be done,
including
to negotiate the series of Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) that
would
govern
MND(SE)’s future support for the Iraqi Security Forces
post‑transition.32
35.
Three such
MOUs were required, between:
•
the MNF‑I
and the Iraqi Government;
•
the Iraqi
Government and the Governor of Muthanna; and
•
the
Governor of Muthanna and MND(SE) – this one, in particular, needed
to be
in place
before transition could occur.
36.
A key
provision in each MOU was definition of the circumstances in which
the MNF
would
re‑engage in a province post‑PIC.
37.
On 21 June the
British Embassy Baghdad reported on the first week of the
Baghdad
Security
Plan.33
There were
early signs that the plan was having a practical effect,
with
a fall in
attacks followed by a spike in Vehicle‑Borne Improvised Explosive
Devices
(VBIEDs)
which again tailed off. It was “not yet clear whether the violence
would
continue to
drop or would settle at a new lower plateau”.
38.
Mr Browne
visited Iraq from 18 to 22 June, travelling to both Baghdad and
Basra
and meeting
senior Iraqi figures including Prime Minister Maliki and Defence
Minister
Qadir.34
The purpose
of his visit was:
“… to drive
the implementation of the new security plan for Basra – to
get
assurances
from key figures in the National Government that they will
take
ownership
of the plan, and to build working relationships with them so we can
keep
that plan
on track.”
39.
Mr Browne
wrote to Mr Blair whilst in transit to Basra to tell him that
the Ministerial
Committee
on National Security had approved the Basra Security Plan and that
Prime
Minister
Maliki had announced that Muthanna would transition to PIC early.
Mr Browne
“was able
to follow it up with an extensive round of British, Iraqi and world
media”.
40.
The letter
also sounded a note of caution, observing that “we should keep
things
in perspective,
and in particular not expect any immediate troop reductions”.
Mr Browne
identified
a parallel with Afghanistan, based on:
“… a
tension between, on the one hand, our growing conviction that
reconstruction
and better
governance must be delivered alongside improved security, rather
than
31
Minutes, 6
July 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
32
Minute
Cullen to MA/CJO, 22 June 2006, ‘MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –
22 June 2006’.
33
eGram
25679/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 21 June 2006, ‘Baghdad Security
Plan: First Week
Assessment’.
34
Letter
Browne to Prime Minister, 22 June 2006, ‘Update on Visit to
Iraq’.
9