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13.1  |  Resources
Funding for a British Embassy and security
353.  Contingency planning in the FCO, including for the procurement of armoured
vehicles, portable accommodation and equipment to support the re‑opening of a UK
Office in Baghdad, had begun by September 2002.209
354.  Mr Straw wrote to Mr Boateng on 17 February 2003, seeking £6.3m from the
Reserve to cover costs incurred in preparing for possible conflict or regime change
in Iraq.210 That comprised:
£3m for a ‘container’ Embassy in Baghdad;
£1.2m for Chemical Biological Warfare (CBW) suits and air monitors;
£740,000 for armoured cars, and for additional guards and security across
the region;
£668,000 for communications equipment for Baghdad;
£380,000 for additional staffing costs in London; and
£316,000 for an increased public diplomacy and information campaign.
355.  Mr Straw stated that, in the event of a conflict, the FCO would have to make
a further claim.
356.  Mr Boateng replied two days later, agreeing the bids for the Embassy, CBW suits
and air monitors, armoured cars and additional security, and communications equipment
(a total of £5.62 million).211 He rejected the bids for additional staffing in London and
the public diplomacy and information campaign, arguing that “these were of a size and
nature that we would expect the FCO to absorb”.
Accuracy of pre‑conflict estimates of costs
357.  Sir Nicholas Macpherson told the Inquiry:
“Forecasts for the overall net additional costs of military operations, as well as
estimates for UOR expenditure, were produced by the Ministry of Defence in
consultation with the Treasury. The estimates were based on historical data coupled
with assumptions on the anticipated operational tempo, activity and conditions for
the forthcoming 12 months.”212
358.  Addressing the accuracy of those estimates, Sir Nicholas Macpherson told the
Inquiry:
“We [the Treasury] were making estimates through the autumn of 2002.
The Treasury doesn’t always get forecasts right, and it didn’t get this forecast totally
209 Minute Collecott to Jay, 27 September 2002, ‘Iraq Contingency Measures’.
210 Letter Straw to Boateng, 17 February 2003, ‘Iraq and Terrorism Costs’.
211 Letter Boateng to Straw, 19 February 2003, ‘Reserve Claim for Iraq and Terrorism Costs’.
212 Statement, 15 January 2010, page 3.
501
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