3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
352.
On Iraq, Sir
David reported that the US was conducting a full review of the
options.
The US had
been reviewing the possibilities before 9/11, but the attacks had
given the
process new
urgency. He had stated that:
“… Saddam
would only be overthrown if there was a strategy which
co-ordinated
work on all
aspects of the problem. We should be patient. We must prepare
very
carefully,
even if Saddam felt the net tightening. We should do it right
rather than
do it
quickly.”
353.
In the context
of a discussion about what had changed since 1991, including
the
availability
of precision weapons and Saddam’s “new WMD capabilities”, Sir
David
wrote:
“We should
make more of the WMD menace presented by Saddam: people
were
far more
sensitive to the dangers after what we had discovered in
Afghanistan.
And we
should take the time and trouble to maintain the support of the
coalition that
we had
worked so hard to build. The moderate Arabs were impressed by our
swift
and
successful conduct of the Afghan campaign … They were also united
in loathing
Saddam. If
we contrived his initial overthrow, with outside support, they
might stick
with
us.”
354.
Sir David
concluded that the discussions “had been worth the journey” and
that it
seemed the
thinking “at the top level of the Administration” was “very close”
to Mr Blair’s.
The
Administration was “open to Mr Blair’s ideas”.
355.
Sir David
suggested that Mr Blair should talk to President Bush and
propose
a US/UK
group to “take the Iraq issue forward together”. At the request of
the US,
the discussions
would need to be “extremely tightly held, involving only
No.10/SIS/
Cabinet
Office”.
356.
Mr Blair wrote
on the minute: “I agree with all this as
discussed.”162
357.
After his
return to London, Sir David Manning sent a copy of the paper he
had
taken to
Washington to the Private Secretaries to Mr Straw and Mr Hoon, Sir
Richard
Wilson, Mr
Scarlett, Sir Richard Dearlove, Mr Powell and Sir Christopher
Meyer.163
358.
There was no
mention in that letter of Sir David’s visit to Washington or
the
substance
of the discussions.
359.
Sir David’s
report of the discussions for Mr Blair was not sent to anyone
outside
No.10.
162
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 6 December 2001,
‘Meeting with
Condi Rice:
Iraq and Phase 2’.
163
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 7 December 2001, ‘The War Against Terrorism:
The Second Phase’.
371