3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
137.
Sir David
Manning asked Mr Hoon for further advice on the steps
which
would be
necessary to keep open the option of a deploying a large scale
force
by the
end of the year.
138.
Sir David
also asked that military planners should make the conditions
for
UK
involvement in military operations clear to their US
counterparts.
139.
Sir David
Manning wrote to Mr Peter Watkins, Mr Hoon’s Principal
Private
Secretary,
on 25 June stating that, in response to Mr Hoon’s minute of 31
May,
Mr Blair
had:
“… asked
for further advice on precisely what steps would have to be taken
now,
including
financial commitments … to keep open the possibility of deploying
a
large scale
force by the end of this year – bearing in mind that we might
not get
140.
Sir David
wrote that it was “encouraging that following the Rumsfeld visit,
our
military
planners have now been invited to discussions with the US” (see
Section 6.1).
He
added:
“It will be
important, as the Defence Secretary acknowledged in his
minute,
to make clear
the conditions for UK involvement in military action set out by
the
Prime
Minister. Public opinion needs to be prepared, the UN inspectors’
route needs
to be given
every chance of success and there must be progress in tackling
the
Arab/Israel
crisis.”
141.
Mr Watkins
wrote to Sir David Manning on 26 June reporting that the US
was
understood
to be seeking:
“•
the removal
of the Hussein regime;
•
the
neutralisation of WMD within Iraq;
•
the
elimination of a safe haven for terrorists;
•
an
acceptable new government.”66
142.
Mr Watkins
stated that the US goals:
“… broadly
align with the objective previously agreed by the Foreign and
Defence
Secretaries
… although Mr Hoon understands that Mr Straw, rightly, sees
removal
of Saddam
as a way point – if necessary and justified – to the final outcome
rather
than an
objective in its own right.”
65
Letter
Manning to Watkins, 25 June 2002, ‘Iraq’.
66
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 26 June 2002, ‘Iraq’.
27