1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
120.
Sir
Christopher Meyer told the Inquiry that, throughout 2000, concern
grew about
how long
the NFZs could legally be sustained and about how to respond if an
aircraft
was shot
down.71
Those
concerns were greater in the UK than in the US.
121.
On 13 December
2000, at the request of Lord Williams of Mostyn,
Attorney
General
from 1999 to June 2001, and the FCO, the JIC assessed the
persecution of
ethnic and
religious communities in Iraq and how it was constrained by the
NFZs.72
122.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements were:
•
Saddam
Hussein’s regime saw Iraq’s Kurds and Shia as a threat
and
discriminated
against them politically and in the allocation of
resources.
Human
rights abuses had extended to the use of military force. “Since
1991,
international
monitoring and coalition enforcement of the NFZs had
constrained
but not prevented this persecution”.
•
In the
north, Saddam Hussein wanted to regain full control of the
Kurdish
Autonomous
Zone. Iraq’s military forces were positioned to re-take the
territory.
•
Abolition
of the northern NFZ would weaken the US “red line” and have a
major
impact on
Kurdish confidence. “Any
resistance [to a
military assault by Saddam
Hussein]
would be
put down brutally and scores settled, inducing a
refugee
crisis
comparable to 1996”. If the
Kurds united to resist Saddam Hussein, a
full-scale
attack to re-take the north would lead to a “major
humanitarian crisis
comparable to
1991”.
•
In the
south, Saddam used his security forces “to destroy villages,
assassinate
Shia
clerics and execute suspects and their families”.
•
If the
southern NFZ were withdrawn, Iraqi air power would be used “to
enhance
operations
now conducted by ground forces”. Such attacks would give
Saddam
Hussein
more military options and “add to Shia
misery”. But
Saddam did not
need to
kill or injure more Shia to achieve his current
objectives.
•
“Wide
international support at the creation of the NFZs in 1991-92 has
faded,
especially
since 1998. The NFZs are increasingly seen as an obstacle
to
progress on
Iraq at the UN. Iraqi propaganda is effective in falsifying
and
exaggerating
civilian casualties and collateral damage.”
123.
The JIC
Assessment did not satisfactorily address all Lord
Williams’
questions.
124.
On 21
December, Lord Williams’ Private Office wrote to Mr Patey asking
for further
information
and clarification on a number of points relating to the situation
in the areas
71
Public
hearing, 26 November 2009, pages 19-20.
72
JIC
Assessment, 13 December 2000, ‘Impact of the NFZs on Iraqi
Persecution’.
213