The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1175.
Lord Goldsmith
wrote to Mr Blair on 7 March, recording that he had been
asked
for advice
on the legality of military action against Iraq without another
resolution of the
1176.
That is
addressed in Section 5.
1177.
When
Mr Blair spoke to President Bush at 1800 on 7 March, he
emphasised
the
importance of securing nine positive votes in the Security Council
for
Parliamentary
approval for UK military action.
1178.
Mr Blair
argued that while the 17 March deadline in the draft resolution
was
not
sufficient for Iraq to disarm fully, it was sufficient to make a
judgement on
whether
Saddam Hussein had had a change of heart. If Iraq started to
co-operate,
the
inspectors could have as much time as they liked.
1179.
Sir David
Manning discussed the response to French and Russian tactics to try
to
prevent a
vote on the draft resolution with Dr Rice on 7
March.354
Sir David
told Dr Rice
that the UK
“had to have” a vote: that it “had to have one that was understood
to be an
ultimatum”;
and that it “had to have nine votes”. The UK “could probably manage
the
political
fall-out if there were a veto, or perhaps even two vetoes”, but the
UK “could not
take part
in military campaign if they did not reach the nine vote threshold.
We would not
be able to
get the necessary Parliamentary support.”
1180.
Sir David
Manning subsequently told Dr Rice that President Putin was
opposed
to the
resolution and would reject it. There was also a further discussion
of the political
position in
the UK: Sir David “repeated at length” the point he had made that
morning
and said
that “we had to do whatever it took to secure nine votes”. That
“might mean
adjusting
the wording of the second resolution; it might mean time; or it
might mean
some sort
of benchmarking”.
1181.
Sir David
reported that Dr Rice had assured him that President Bush
was
determined
to deliver nine votes. Sir David also commented: “But although
the
Administration
is clearly pulling out all the stops, there is still no sign of
willingness
to accept
that this may mean extending the time lines.”
1182.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries:
“Condi
[Rice] had told David [Manning] overnight that Putin had been clear
with
Bush that
they would veto a second resolution. Also we still didn’t have a
clue as
to whether
Chile and Mexico would come over. The mood was gloomier than
ever.
353
Minute
Goldsmith to Prime Minister, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Resolution
1441’.
354
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversations with Condi
Rice’.
394