The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
implicit
authority.102
Ms
Wilmshurst wrote that no decisions had been taken on the
drafts
and no
discussions had begun with the US, but the FCO would welcome any
comments
Lord
Goldsmith might wish to make on the options.
274.
Ms Adams
replied that, having regard to the terms of resolution 1441 and
the
previous
practice of the Council, Lord Goldsmith considered that “where the
Security
Council
determines that Iraq had committed a sufficiently serious breach of
the
conditions
of the cease-fire imposed by resolution 687 (1991)” to revive the
authorisation
in
resolution 678(1990), an implicit resolution would be sufficient to
revive the
authorisation
to use force in resolution 678.103
275.
The “critical
element” was that “there has been a finding, in whatever form, by
the
Security
Council itself”, and that “A Presidential Statement would also be
sufficient”.
276.
Ms Adams wrote
that Lord Goldsmith did not at that stage intend to offer
any
detailed
drafting comments on the proposed text, “given that it is likely
that they will
change in
discussions with the US”.
277.
In relation to
the possibility of issuing an “ultimatum”, Lord Goldsmith’s view
was
that “would
need to be expressed in very clear terms so there is no room for
doubt
whether or
not Iraq had met the Council’s demands. Otherwise there is a risk
of opening
up a debate
about whether there is a need for a further determination by the
Council that
Iraq had
failed to comply with the new ultimatum.”
278.
Ms Adams
recorded that Lord Goldsmith wished to make clear that a
second
resolution
authorising the use of force “would not give an unlimited right to
use force
against
Iraq”. Lord Goldsmith considered that any use of force would have
to be directed
towards the
objective of securing compliance with the disarmament obligations,
which
the
Security Council had already determined in resolution 687(1991) and
subsequent
relevant
resolutions were “necessary requirements for restoring
international peace
and
security in the area”. The use of force would, moreover, have to be
limited to what
was
“necessary to enforce those obligations, and be a proportionate
response to Iraq’s
breach”.
279.
Ms Adams
explicitly stated that Lord Goldsmith’s comments were “made
without
prejudice
to the separate question … of whether a second resolution is
legally required”.
He had also
asked to be “kept closely informed of developments” and wished “to
have
the
opportunity to comment on any draft which is to be tabled for
discussion with other
members of
the Council”.
280.
Mr Grainger
wrote to Mr Macleod, to convey the substance of the advice
in
102
Letter
Wilmshurst to Adams, 27 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Second
Resolution’.
103
Letter
Adams to Wilmshurst, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Second
Resolution’.
104
Letter
Grainger to Macleod, 31 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Second
Resolution’.
54