The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
728.
As a
consequence, Lt Gen Rollo considered that there were four main
issues for
the UK to
engage with in 2008:
•
Working out
where the UK military contribution in Iraq sat within the
wider
strategic
relationship with the US: “I fully appreciate that there are wider
factors
at play,
but it may nevertheless be helpful to make the obvious point that
the US
military
main effort (with 15 brigades deployed here, even in July 2008,
against
two in
Afghanistan) unquestionably remains Iraq, that this will still be
the case in
2009, and
that General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker consistently
express
their wish
for us to remain.”
•
Determining
the role, size and duration of the UK’s national effort in
Basra:
“Our military
effort … should be focused on support to the ISF. Our
national
effort
should be focused on political and economic development in the
area.
But of
course the two are inextricably related … This will need national
effort and
needs to be
properly resourced … In the long run Basra should be a
success,
but without
coalition support (which Petraeus and Crocker clearly believe
should
be British
led) we risk it going backwards in the short to medium
term.”
•
Working out
the extent to which the UK wished to support the ISF more
broadly
in the
future.
•
Engaging
with the US on the restructuring of MNF-I, MNC-I and MNSTC-I,
both
in terms of
headquarters and basing.
729.
Lt Gen Rollo
concluded:
“To say
that the next six months in Iraq will be critical is a truism. What
is clear is that
the Iraqis,
and their allies, have been given a chance to move decisively in
the right
direction,
which if squandered is [not] likely to be reproduced.”
730.
On 3 January,
Mr Brown met Prime Minister Maliki in the UK and urged him
to
make
progress on the Hydrocarbons Law and on local elections as well as
to appoint
Iraqi staff
to support the Basra Development Forum.345
He also
encouraged Prime
Minister
Maliki to convene a further meeting of the “3 plus 1” Executive
Group and to
re‑appoint
Gen Mohan and Gen Jalil for another term. Prime Minister Maliki
agreed
to the
re‑appointments, and said he would increase Basra’s
budget.
731.
One of Maj Gen
Binns’ senior officers met Gen Mohan on 4 January to
discuss
MND(SE)
proposals for future support to the ISF (a “scalable support
package”).346
Gen Mohan
suggested that an MOU would be required to formalise the
arrangement
and
guarantee the support. Maj Gen Binns commented that an MOU “would
not be
345
Letter
Fletcher to Carver, 3 January 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s Bilateral
with Prime Minister of Iraq,
3 January’.
346
Minute
Binns to CJO, 10 January 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 10
January 2008’.
316