3.6 | Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003

116. Mr Scarlett wrote to No.10 on 21 November to highlight new intelligence on

Iraq’s thinking on managing UNMOVIC which he considered “confirmed” earlier

JIC judgements.

117. Mr Scarlett concluded that the Iraqi regime was confident in its ability

to mislead the inspectors.

118. Subsequent intelligence that Saddam Hussein had made clear that UNMOVIC

was to be given no grounds for claiming that inspections were being obstructed

was interpreted as part of a policy of concealment. The possibility that it might

have indicated an intention to co‑operate with UNMOVIC appears not to have been

considered.

119. Mr Scarlett wrote to Sir David Manning and other senior officials on 21 November

drawing their attention to “the first significant … intelligence we have received on

the Iraqi regime’s thinking on how to manage UNMOVIC” since the adoption of

resolution 1441.38

120. Mr Scarlett stated that the key points were:

• Iraq intended to demonstrate its ostensible co‑operation with UNMOVIC but

would actually resume its game playing.

• Iraq intended to declare a small part of its illegal programmes, and overload

UNMOVIC with large quantities of information on legitimate activities.

• WMD was seen as vital to the regime’s survival, so a core WMD capability and

infrastructure must be retained.

• Iraq was concerned about the provisions for conducting interviews of Iraqis

outside Iraq, which could expose illicit procurement.

• There was concern about the potential destruction by the inspectors of dual‑use

facilities.

121. Mr Scarlett commented that the concerns exposing illicit procurement might be

referring to conventional weapons programmes and that the dual‑use facilities supported

“the WMD programmes”.

122. Mr Scarlett wrote that the intelligence confirmed earlier JIC judgements, including

the identification of “overload” as a potential strategy. There was no intelligence on which

illegal programmes might be declared.

123. Mr Scarlett also drew attention to preparations to intimidate potential Iraqi

interviewees.

38 Minute Scarlett to Manning, 21 November 2002, ‘Iraqi Strategy for Dealing with UNMOVIC’.

25